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STATE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW AS A MODEL FOR AMENDING THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT*
I.

INTRO
By now, the rise and fall of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)1 is a familiar

story. The Act was hailed as a revolutionary measure that would bring individuals with
disabilities into the mainstream of American life.2 Instead of relying on outdated notions that
defined an individual s disability solely on the basis of the existence of an impairment or an
impairment that prevented the individual from being gainfully employed, the ADA, like its
predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,3 was to take a functional, civil rights approach to the
problem of disability discrimination. With its creation of a three-pronged definition of disability,
Congress took notice of the fact that not all actual physical or mental impairments were
inherently limiting, and that, in the words of the Supreme Court, society s accumulated myths
and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow
from actual impairment.

4

Thus, the ADA would cover individuals who not only had actual
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1
42 U.S.C.
12101-213 (1994 & Supp. 2002).
2
See, e.g., Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35
GA. L. REV. 27, 30 (2000).
3
29 U.S.C. 701 (1998).
4
School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987).
1

physical or mental impairments that substantially limited major life activities, but also those
individuals who had records of such impairments or were regarded as having such impairments.5
Moreover, the Act was to go beyond the approach of first-generation anti-discrimination
statutes such as Title VII6 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)7 in the sense
of merely prohibiting unequal treatment of individuals with disabilities. Instead, discrimination
in employment under the ADA would include the failure to make reasonable accommodations to
the known physical or mental limitations of a qualified individual with a disability unless the
employer could demonstrate that providing the accommodation would result in an undue
hardship.8 Thus, employers would be required to alter their workplaces or practices within
reason in order to allow disabled employees equal opportunity to compete in the workplace.
Congress also used this reasonable accommodation concept to define which individuals were
protected under the Act. A qualified individual with a disability would be one who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, could perform the essential functions of the position the
individual holds or desires.9 Thus, Congress inclusion of the reasonable accommodation
concept represented a recognition on its part that discrimination against the disabled frequently
involves an ignorance of the special circumstances of individuals with disabilities or an
unwillingness to make minor, relatively inexpensive modifications to the established ways of

5
6
7
8
9

42 U.S.C.
42 U.S.C.
29 U.S.C.
42 U.S.C.
42 U.S.C.

12102(2).
2000e (1994).
621 et seq. (1994).
12112(b)(5)(A).
12111(8).
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doing business that would allow disabled employees to participate in the workplace in and
society as a whole.10
The result of this re-evaluation of the concept of disability and the imposition of an
affirmative obligation on the part of employers and other covered entities to remove unnecessary
barriers that had long operated to exclude individuals with disabilities was to be the integration
of individuals with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of American life.11
According to sponsors, in addition to being the right thing to do for people with disabilities,
passage of the ADA was also the right way to help strengthen our economy and enhance our
international competitiveness.

12

In particular, the employment-related provision of the ADA,

Title I, would help reduce the staggeringly high level of unemployment among individuals with
disabilities.13 In sum, hopes were high for what supporters referred to as the 20th century
emancipation proclamation for people with disabilities.

14

Yet, less than five years after the ADA took effect, there was a widespread feeling that
the Act was already a disappointment.15 Statistics soon began to pour in suggesting that not only

10

S. Elizabeth Malloy, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Why Disability Claims are
Different, 33 CONN. L. REV. 603, 621 (2001).
11
H.R. REP. No. 101-485 (II), at 22 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304.
12
135 CONG. REC. S 10714 (daily ed. Sep. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
13
See H.R. REP. No. 101-485 (IV), at 35 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 512, 524. The
figure most commonly cited was that [t]wo-thirds of all disabled Americans between the age of
16 and 64 are not working at all; yet 66 percent of those not working say they want to work. Id.
at S 10712 (statement of Sen. Harkin) (quoting Lou Harris poll).
14
135 CONG. REC. S 10711 (statement of Sen. Harkin).
15
See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., Substantially Limited Protection from Disability
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of
Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 415 (1997) (stating that the courts restrictive interpretation
of protection under the ADA represents a considerable journey down the wrong road .... );
Arlene B. Mayerson, Symposium, Restoring Regard for the Regarded as Prong: Giving Effect
3

had the ADA not been the windfall for plaintiffs that many business interests had feared, if
anything, the Act had been a windfall for defendants.16 Roughly seven years after the Act s
effective date, the Supreme Court significantly restricted the scope of the ADA s coverage in a
trilogy of cases that was met with widespread dismay.17 Three years later, the Supreme Court
once again generally sided with employers in a new round of ADA cases.18
Thus, despite the promise of the ADA, the overwhelming consensus among scholars is
that the Act has not lived up to its potential. For some commentators, the main problem has been
what they perceive to be the tendency of federal courts to provide an overly-restrictive
interpretation of the Act. According to these commentators, the root causes of this tendency are
the failure of federal courts to fully appreciate the differences between the ADA and other antidiscrimination statutes,19 a failure on the part of courts to fully understand what it means to be
disabled or the different type of discrimination that individuals with disabilities face,20 and/or a
generalized hostility to the notion contained within the ADA that equal opportunity for
individuals with disabilities may actually require unequal or preferential treatment for such

to Congressional Intent, 42 VILL. L. REV. 587, 587 (1997) (arguing that restrictive judicial
interpretations of the ADA reflect, at best, a lack of understanding of the statute and, at worst, a
blatant hostility towards the profound goals of the ADA. ).
16
Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (1999).
17
McGowan, supra note 2, at 81.
18
Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc. v. Williams, 122 S. Ct. 681 (2002); US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122
S. Ct. 1516 (2002); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002).
19
See Malloy, supra note 10, at 607; Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil
Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 23 (2000).
20
See Michael Ashley Stein, Book Review, Disability, Employment Policy, and the Supreme
Court, 55 STAN. L. REV. 607, 625 (2002); Jane Byeff Korn, Cancer and the ADA: Rethinking
Disability, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 442 (2001).
4

individuals.21 Whatever the cause, the result has been employer success rates in ADA litigation
hovering in the neighborhood of 90%.22 Other commentators have placed the blame, at least in
part, on the language of the ADA itself. These commentators have argued that although the
judicial interpretations of the terms contained within the phrase qualified individual with a
disability have been cramped and possibly contrary to congressional intent, they are not
necessarily illogical or contrary to generally-accepted methods of statutory construction.23 As
such, some commentators have suggested that the key to effectuating the ADA s goals is not a
change in the judicial mindset, but a change to the text of the ADA.24
In light of the increasing calls for judicial re-evaluation or legislative amendment of the
ADA, it seems appropriate to pause to consider the fact that discrimination against individuals
with disabilities is not exclusively a federal problem. Nor is the federal government necessarily
the only source capable of effectively dealing with the problem of discrimination against the
disabled. One of the benefits of the federal system is that states can serve as social laboratories
and experiment with solutions to social problems.25 These state solutions may, in turn, prompt

21

See Diller, supra note 19, at 23; Burgdorf, supra note 15, at 411.
See Colker, supra note 15, at 101, 108; Patricia Manson, Study: Disabled Losing Nearly All
Discrimination Cases, CHICAGO DAILY LAW BULLETIN, 1, June 19, 2003.
23
See McGowan, supra note 2, at 112; Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation in Activities Regarding
Major Life Activities: The Failure of the Disability Definition in the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1470-71 (1999); see also Chai R. Feldblum,
Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And
What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 140-41 (2000) (noting the
failure of courts to grasp the congressional intent underlying the ADA, but adding, The bottom
line is that statutory text matters, sometimes even too much. ).
24
See infra notes 186-201 and accompanying text.
25
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
22
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nationwide reform.26 There is a long history of dialogue between the states and the federal
government concerning social policy, particularly in the area of individual rights.27 In some
instances, the legislative or judicial branch of the federal government initiates a dialogue with the
states about individual rights that results either in the creation of a nationwide standard or more
experimentation among the states.28 In other instances, the states have served as the catalyst for
federal reform.29 Sometimes the dialogue is more involved. For example, Congress modeled
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on existing state-anti-discrimination laws, but went
further than some states by prohibiting sex discrimination.30 The enactment of Title VII and the
development of federal case law under the measure led more states to adopt their own antidiscrimination laws and to follow federal decisional law, thus resulting in an essentially national
approach to certain forms of employment discrimination.31 Despite this uniformity, numerous
states have provided for even greater protection from discrimination than that found in federal
legislation, most notably in the form of protection from genetic discrimination32 and sexual
orientation discrimination.33 These state innovations have, in turn, led to suggestions that

26

For example, when the American Bar Association s (ABA) Ethics 2000 Committee began the
task of revising the ABA s Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, it reviewed the ethics
codes of each state to determine how states may have varied from the Model Rules and how their
experimentations worked in practice. See Nancy J. Moore, Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting in the
Twenty-First Century, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 923, 932-33 (2002).
27
Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence Against Women Act, and the Use and
Abuse of Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 87 (2002).
28
Id. at 89-90.
29
Goldfarb, supra note 27, at 90.
30
Id. at 90-91.
31
Id. at 91.
32
See Pauline T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee
Protections for a Brave New Workplace, 96 NW U. L. REV. 1497, 1515 (2002).
33
See Jeremy S. Barber, Comment, Re-Orienting Sexual Harassment: Why Federal Legislation
6

Congress might possibly use these more expansive state statutes as models for federal
legislation.34
Thus far, nearly all of the scholarship concerning employment discrimination against
individuals with disabilities has focused on the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,35 the two dominant federal laws in the area. However, the
states have not entirely ceded the field to the federal government. Even prior to the ADA s
enactment in 1990, 48 states had statutes outlawing employment discrimination against
individuals with disabilities in the private sector.36 And while a number of states have since
amended their statutes or interpretive regulations to bring them into harmony with federal law, a
sizable minority continue to chart their own course by eschewing reliance on the federal model.37

is Needed to Cure Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Law, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 493, 523 (2002).
See Goldfarb, supra note 27, at 91 (stating that more protective state statutes provide a
roadmap for possible future reforms of federal law. ); Patricia A. Roche, The Genetic Revolution
at Work: Legislative Efforts to Protect Employees, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 271, 281 (2002)
(discussing state approaches to genetic discrimination as a possible model for federal legislation).
35
29 U.S.C. 794 (1994).
36
See Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an Employer s
Financial Hardship Becomes Undue Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L.
REV. 391, 395 n.16 (1995).
37
See infra notes 226-234 and accompanying text.
34
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Indeed, in at least two instances since 1999, a state has amended its statute, in part, to address
some of the perceived shortcomings of the ADA.38
This Article examines the extent to which state anti-discrimination law can serve as a
model for federal reform in light of the growing criticisms of federal law. Part II catalogs the
federal government s evolving approach toward disability discrimination, which ultimately
resulted in the passage of the Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act. Part II
discusses the Supreme Court s interpretations of the ADA and the negative reaction and
dissatisfaction that Court s pronouncements on the Act have produced among commentators. In
addition, it discusses some of the suggested modifications to the ADA and its protected-class
approach that commentators have offered. Part IV surveys state laws prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of disability and discusses the different approaches taken by the states. Finally, Part
V examines in greater depth some of the state statutes that take an approach to disability
discrimination entirely different than that taken by the ADA. It compares the alternative
approaches offered by some commentators with the actual working models present in some states
and makes some preliminary evaluations as to their overall potential to serve as models for
federal reform.

II

THE EVOLVING CONCEPTION OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION AT THE
FEDERAL LEVEL
A.

38

Historical Treatment of Individuals with Disabilities

See infra notes 258-266 and accompanying text.
8

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 represented dramatic departures from the traditional governmental and societal approaches
toward individuals with disabilities. Up until the 20th century, the prevailing view of individuals
with disabilities was as objects of pity.39 Such individuals were viewed as unable to function in
society, and thus were either excluded from or cared for outside the mainstream of society.40 In
keeping with this view, states took it upon themselves to care for individuals with disabilities by
constructing almshouses for the physically disabled and asylums for the mentally ill.41
The approach toward individuals with disabilities shifted during the first half of the
twentieth century from a model of pity and exclusion to one of rehabilitation. Under this
conception of disability, the problem that individuals with physical and mental impairments
faced were the impairments themselves.42 Under this so-called medical model, the best way to
help the disabled was to use medicine to cure or lessen the effects of an impairment or to employ
rehabilitation techniques to enable individuals to overcome the effects of their impairments.43 In
keeping with this approach, Congress passed legislation during World War I and shortly
thereafter to create vocational rehabilitation programs for disabled veterans and civilians to help
reintegrate them into the workforce.44 The primary focus of federal legislation throughout much
of the twentieth century was on an individual s impairment itself and how it affected the
individual s ability to work. Under the Vocational Rehabilitation Amendments of 1954, for

39
40
41
42
43
44

Feldblum, supra note 23, at 95.
Id.
Id. at 94-95.
Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 641, 650 (1999).
Id.
Feldblum, supra note 23, at 95-96, n. 25.
9

example, a physically disabled individual was one who is under a physical or mental disability
which constitutes or results in a substantial handicap to employment, but which is of such a
nature that vocational rehabilitation services may reasonably be expected to render him fit to
engage in remunerative occupation.

45

Similarly, only those individuals who were out of work

and who were unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity were entitled to financial
support under the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) system.46 Furthermore, in order to
be eligible for the receipt of SSDI benefits, an individual must also have a medically
determinable physical or mental impairment.

47

Thus, the SSDI program takes a primarily work-

related view of the problems associated with disabilities and reflects the view that the problems
faced by individuals with disabilities are essentially caused by biology, rather than societal
attitudes.48
B.

The Rehabilitation Act of 1973

Beginning with the civil rights movement of the 1960s, the governmental approach
toward individuals with disabilities began to change. Drawing upon the civil rights successes of
other groups, individuals with disabilities began to reject society s attitudes of pity, charity, or
rehabilitation.

49

Instead, a new conception of disability began to emerge, one which viewed the

cause of the problems faced by individuals with disabilities not always as the physical or mental
impairments of such persons, but the barriers

both physical and attitudinal

45

erected by society

Pub. L. No. 565, 11, 68 Stat. 652, 660 (1954); Feldblum, supra note 23, at 96.
Social Security Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-880, 103(a), 70 Stat. 807, 815-24
(1956); 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(1)(A) (1994).
47
42 U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(A).
48
Crossley, supra note 42, at 629, 651.
49
Feldblum, supra note 23, at 97.

46
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as a whole.50 Under this new conception of disability, independent living, equal opportunity,
and integration could be achieved, not necessarily by changing the person with the impairment,
but by changing the societal lack of understanding and unequal treatment of such persons.
This new understanding of what it meant to have a disability soon began to materialize in
federal legislation.51 Perhaps the most important example is Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 and the amendments to the Act in 1974. Added to the existing Rehabilitation Act
with little forethought by Senate staffers,52 Section 504 provided that no otherwise qualified
handicapped individual ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance.

53

Thus, individuals with disabilities now enjoyed

protection from discrimination in the public sector comparable to the protections against
discrimination based on race, gender, etc. enjoyed in the private sector by virtue of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Section 504's language borrowed heavily from the language of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act54 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.55 Despite the use of other civil
rights statutes as a blueprint, Section 504 retained some aspects of the older conception of
disability, which defined disability in terms of the inability to work. As the Rehabilitation Act
50

Richard K. Scotch, Disability as the Basis for a Social Movement: Advocacy and the Politics
of Definition, 44 J. SOC. ISSUES 159, 159-63 (1988).
51
Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures: Judicial Interpretations of the
Meaning of Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 53, 57 (2000).
52
Feldblum, supra note 23, at 99; Burgdorf, supra note 15, at 419-20.
53
Pub. L. No. 93-112, 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as amended 29 U.S.C. 794(a)
(1998)).
54
42 U.S.C. 794(a) (1994); see Feldblum, supra note 23, at 99.
11

was originally designed to encourage vocational rehabilitation, the Act continued to define an
otherwise qualified handicapped individual in terms of whether the individual had an
impairment that constituted a substantial handicap to employment.

56

However, the new anti-

discrimination mandate of Section 504 went beyond employment and included a prohibition
against discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.
Given the Act s coverage of discriminatory practices in housing, education, and health care,
Congress believed that the existing definition s focus on employability had proven troublesome
and far too narrow and constricting.

57

In 1974, Congress amended Section 504's definition of a

handicapped individual to mean any individual who (i) has a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of such person s major life activities, (ii) has a record of
such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.

58

This new definition contained aspects of both the older conception of disability and the
newer civil rights conception.59 The first prong of the three-pronged definition still required the
existence of some actual physical or mental impairment; however, it defined handicap in terms
of the functional limitations an impairment imposed on an individual. Thus, the first prong of
section 504's defined disability in functional terms, rather than solely medical terms.60 In
addition, the new definition represented a departure from traditional notions of individuals with
disabilities in the sense that it did not focus solely on employability and in the sense that it
55

20 U.S.C. 1681(a) (1994); see Feldblum, supra note 23, at 99.
Pub. L. No. 93-112, 7(6), 87 Stat. 355 (1973).
57
S. Rep. No. 93-1297, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., reprinted at 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, at 6388,
6413(1974); School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 278 n.3 (1987).
58
H.R. 17503, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess. (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 706(8) (1998)).
59
McGowan, supra note 2, at 63 (stating same about the similarly-worded ADA).
56
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required only substantial limitations of major life activities, not total inabilities to function in
society. The inclusion of the second and third prongs in Section 504's definition also represented
a departure from the older medical approach and a move toward a civil rights approach to the
issue of what it means to have a disability.61 Under the record of and regarded as prongs, an
individual need not have a current, actual impairment to fit within the statutory definition.
Instead, these prongs represent a recognition on Congress part that societal attitudes about
disability and disease can be as limiting as the actual physical limitations that flow from an
impairment.62
Despite these changes, the 1974 Amendments still evidenced some possible discomfort
on the part of Congress in providing for an overly-expansive prohibition against discrimination
against individuals with disabilities. Some have suggested that, even prior to the enactment of
Section 504, Congress demonstrated a willingness to act only on behalf of individuals it believed
to be truly disabled. For example, some have argued that the requirement that an individual
have a medically determinable physical or mental impairment in order to be eligible for SSDI
coverage arose out of a congressional fear that people who were able to work would abuse the
system by feigning disability.63 This same concern is perhaps embodied in Section 504's creation
of a protected class. Most anti-discrimination statutes do not limit the scope of their protection to
certain individuals. Title VII, for example, simply prohibits discrimination because of certain

60

Id. at 62.
Id.
62
Arline, 480 U.S. at 284.
63
Crossely, supra note 42, at 651 (citing DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE 79
(1984)).
61
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characteristics such as race, gender, etc.,.64 In contrast, Section 504 requires an individual with a
disability to first establish that he or she is otherwise qualified before she is entitled to
protection under the Act. Putting aside the question of what the word otherwise in the phrase
means,65 numerous critics have questioned the need to define the Act s coverage in terms of
qualified individuals.

66

Indeed, in 1972 Representative Charles Vanik introduced a bill that

would have amended Title VII to prohibit discrimination because of physical or mental handicap
in employment ... unless there is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.

67

The bill failed to make it out of

committee.68
One explanation for the inclusion of the otherwise qualified language is that the drafters
feared that Section 504 might be interpreted to mean that, as is the case with other antidiscrimination statutes prohibiting consideration of certain characteristics in employment
decisions, a person s disability could play no role in eligibility determinations.69 However,
Robert Burgdorf, one of the chief authors of the ADA, has suggested that Section 504's protected
class approach is symptomatic of a larger problem: a lingering view of the disabled as being

64

29 U.S.C. 20002-e(a) (1994).
The Supreme Court has clarified that [a]n otherwise qualified person is one who is able to
meet all of a program s requirements in spite of his handicap, rather than one who is qualified
except for the handicap. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 407 n.7
(1979).
66
See, e.g., Burgdorf, supra note 15, at 422 (citing the positions of the U.S. Civil Rights
Commission and the National Council on Disability);
67
H.R. 140333, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (cited in Burgdorf, supra note 15, at 418).
68
See Burgdorf, supra note 15, at 418.
69
Id. at 428.
65
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objects of pity and charity.70 Burgdorf and others have argued that Section 504's protected class
approach is based on a view that there is a certain core group of severely disabled people who
are deserving of the special service of being protected from discrimination.

71

Only when an

individual with an impairment fits within a societal stereotype of the truly disabled is such an
individual deserving of the protection of anti-discrimination law.
In time, the contours of the otherwise qualified language were fleshed out through
regulations and case law. In 1978, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)
deleted the troublesome word otherwise in its regulations and referred instead to qualified
handicapped persons.

72

Through case law and regulations, a qualified handicapped person

was defined as one who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the position in question without endangering the health and safety of the individual
or others and who ... [m]eets the experience and/or education requirements of the position in
question.

73

Case law under the Rehabilitation Act was relatively scarce prior to the enactment of the
ADA in 1990.74 Several commentators have stated that questions of whether an individual had a
handicap were rarely at issue in most Rehabilitation Act cases prior to 1990.75 Indeed, in 1987,

70

Id. at 568.
Id.; see Eichhorn, supra note 23, at 1426 ( Another possible rationale behind the protected
class structure is the fear that people who are not truly disabled will somehow take advantage of
antidiscrimination laws. ).
72
Burgdorf, supra note 15, at 422.
73
29 C.F.R. 1613.702(f) (1994) (quoted in Fedro v. Reno, 21 F.3d 1391, 1396 (7th Cir.
1994)).
74
See Epstein, supra note 36, at 433 (stating that only 265 lawsuits had been filed under the
Rehabilitation Act between 1973 and 1990).
75
See, e.g., Feldblum, supra note 23, at 92.
71
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in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, the Supreme Court gave an expansive reading to
Section 504's definition.76 In concluding that an individual with a history of hospitalization for
tuberculosis fit within with Section 504's record of prong, the Court spent little time parsing the
language of the statutory definition and suggested in dicta that an individual who had been
denied an employment opportunity based on the negative reactions of others to an impairment
that was not otherwise substantially limiting could fit under the regarded as prong.77 Thus, on
the eve of Congress consideration of the ADA, most disability rights advocates believed that a
workable approach toward addressing disability discrimination was already in place and could
serve as a model for future legislation.78
C.

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

Although the Rehabilitation Act provided protection from discrimination for federal
employee and employees of those who received federal funds, there was still no antidiscrimination measure in place to protect employees in the private sector from disability
discrimination. Although nearly all states had laws prohibiting discrimination in the private
sector against individuals with disabilities by the late 1980s,79 ADA proponents believed that
state laws were inconsistent and incomplete.

80

In 1990, Congress sought to rectify the situation

through the enactment of the ADA. The Rehabilitation Act served as the blueprint for the ADA.

76

Id. at 128.
480 U.S. at 280-81l; Feldblum, supra note __, at 118, 119.
78
See Feldblum, supra note 23, at 129. See generally Colker, supra note 16, at 278 (stating that
on eve of the effective date of the ADA, Rehabilitation Act plaintiffs in employment
discrimination cases were faring twice as successfully as would ADA plaintiffs over the next
decade).
79
See supra note36 and accompanying text.
80
134 CONG. REC. 5090-02 (1988) (statement of Sen. Simon).
77
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However, an earlier draft of the legislation took a much different approach toward the problem
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities than would the final version of the Act.
An early version of the measure (the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988), drafted by
Robert Burgdorf of the National Council on the Handicapped, was far more expansive than the
version that ultimately became law. Specifically, Burgdorf s version prohibited discrimination
on the basis of handicap, which was then defined as because of a physical or mental
impairment, perceived impairment, or record of impairment.

81

Although this language retained

Section 504's basic three-pronged definition of handicapped, it contained some important
differences. First, Burgdorf s draft eliminated any references to substantial limitations of major
life activities. Instead, the draft simply defined handicap under the first prong of the definition
to mean a physical or mental impairment. A perceived impairment meant not having a
physical or mental impairment as defined [under the first prong], but being regarded as having or
treated as having a physical or mental impairment.

82

A record of impairment meant having a

history of, or having been misclassified as having, a physical or mental impairment.

83

Moreover, in keeping with the criticisms of Section 504 concerning its creation of a protected
class of qualified individuals, Burgdorf s bill omitted any such references. Instead, the draft
explained that it was not a discriminatory practice for an employer to apply neutral standards that
operated to exclude disabled individuals if the standards were both necessary and substantially
related to the ability to perform or participate in the essential components of the particular job
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and such performance or participation cannot be accomplished by reasonable
accommodation.

84

S. 2345,

84

5(b), 134 CONG. REC. 5090-02 (1988).
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Senator Lowell Weicker and 13 Senate co-sponsors introduced the measure in 1988.85
Although the measure received a hearing, no further action was taken on the bill by the time
Congress recessed in October of 1988.86 A new version of the ADA was introduced in May of
1989, which served as the basis for the final version of the Act that was passed in July of 1990.87
Although the new version made a few adjustments (e.g., substituting disability for handicap ),
the new version essentially used the same definitions of disability and qualified individual
that appeared in Section 504's regulations. Disability rights advocates preferred this new
measure over Burdgorf s for several reasons. First, the new version was considered to be more
politically viable.88 Because Burgdorf s bill required employers to make reasonable
accommodations for individuals who simply had physical or mental impairments, rather than
individuals with physical or mental impairments that substantially limited a major life activity,
Burgdorf s bill imposed greater burdens on employers than did Section 504.89 Disability rights
advocates also believed it would be easier to sell to Congress a set of definitions that had been in
use for fifteen years than it would to convince lawmakers to adopt a set of untested definitions.90
Moreover, disability rights advocates believed that the judicial interpretation of the terms
contained within Section 504 and its regulations had been, on the whole, fairly expansive; thus,
they saw little need to tinker with a definition that seemed to be working.91
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Feldblum, supra note 23, at 126.
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Id. at 127.
Id.; McGowan, supra note 2, at 97.
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See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
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The final version of the ADA employed a set of definitions nearly identical to those found
in Section 504 and its regulations. Only qualified individuals with disabilities (or those who
had an association with such an individual) were entitled to protection under the Act.92 The
definition of disability mirrored that of Section 504:
(2) Disability The term disability means, with respect to an individual
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
) being regarded as having such an impairment.93
The EEOC soon promulgated regulations that explained that major life activities included
functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working.

94

Thus, by defining disability both in terms of the

limiting effect an impairment actually had on an individual and how others perceived the
existence of an impairment, the ADA took the same functional, civil rights approach toward
defining its protected class as did Section 504.95
The ADA s definition of a qualified individual with a disability was substantially
similar to the Rehabilitation Act s definition of an otherwise qualified handicapped individual.
The ADA defined a qualified individual with a disability as an individual with a disability
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
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employment position that such individual holds or desires.

96

Congress also provided a non-

exhaustive list of possible reasonable accommodations:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant
position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment
or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals
with disabilities.97
The ADA also attempted to define the scope of an employer s reasonable accommodation
duty by providing that an employer was not required to make such an accommodation where the
employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the employer s business.98 The Act then defined undue hardship in terms of
significant difficulty or expense, and included several factors to be considered in assessing
whether the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on a particular employer.99 One
important distinction between the ADA and Section 504 in this regard was the inclusion of the
96
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7(a)(1), 134 CONG. REC. 5090-02 (1988). Indeed, the reasonable accommodation language in
the first version was dubbed the bankruptcy provision by business interests. See Epstein, supra
note 36, at 423. This language even raised concerns among one of the bill s co-sponsors,
Senator Robert Dole. See 134 CONG. REC. 5090-02 (1988). When the original version of the
ADA was scrapped, the undue hardship language was added, and the legislative history
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the term given under Section 504. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 (II), at 62, reprinted in 1990
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accommodation of reassignment to a vacant position. Instead of requiring that an individual be
able to perform the essential functions of the employment position in question as Section 504
had, an individual with a disability was qualified under the ADA if the individual could perform
the essential functions of the position the individuals holds or desires.

100

The inclusion of or

desires language in the definition of a qualified individual and the inclusion of reassignment to a
vacant position as a possible form of reasonable accommodation was significant. The federal
courts had almost uniformly concluded that an employer was not required under the
Rehabilitation Act to reassign a disabled employee to a vacant position if the employee could no
longer perform the essential functions of the position the employee occupied.101 Federal courts
reached this conclusion on several grounds. Some courts relied heavily on the phrase the
position in question and concluded that an employer s reasonable accommodation duty was
limited to the specific position to which the plaintiff had applied or the position from which the
plaintiff was discharged.102 Other courts relied in part on the argument that reassigning an
individual with a disability would not amount to equal treatment of individuals with disabilities
but would instead provide individuals with disabilities with greater rights than their non-disabled
counterparts.103
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Congress inclusion of reassignment to a vacant position in the list of possible reasonable
accommodations under the ADA eliminated any reliance on the statutory language as a basis for
concluding that reassignment was, per se, not a reasonable accommodation. Thus, under the
ADA the inquiry into whether an individual is qualified is not limited to consideration of the
individual s ability to perform his or her current job.104 Consequently, an employer s reasonable
accommodation duty does not end with an employee s existing job, but may include reassignment
to an entirely different position.105
Expectations were high when the Act became law in 1990.106 Individuals with
disabilities finally had a measure in place that not only ensured them protection from
discrimination in the private sector, but seemed also to express the view that their major
obstacles are not inherent in their disabilities, but arise from barriers that have been imposed
externally and unnecessarily.

107

Although the measure was not as sweeping as some may have

desired, based on past experiences under the Rehabilitation Act, disability rights advocates
believed they had little to fear when the ADA was put to the test in the courts.

III.

THE INTERPRETATION OF THE ADA BY THE FEDERAL COURTS
Despite high hopes for the ADA, disability rights advocates have been greatly

disappointed by the federal courts interpretation of the ADA.108 The tendency of the federal
courts to read the ADA s definition of disability in a narrow fashion, and in particular the
104
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Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1161-62 (10th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1161.
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134 CONG. REC. 5090-02 (1988) (statement of Sen. Weicker).
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Supreme Court s pronouncements on the definition, have left some disability rights advocates
and scholars frustrated. From the perspective of the federal courts, some of the open-ended
concepts employed by the ADA have made resolution of employment discrimination claims
particularly difficult.109
A.

Decisions Concerning the Definition of Disability

1.

Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. and the Mitigating Measures Rule

One issue involving the ADA s definition of disability that has generated significant
consternation is the question of whether an individual s use of measures to correct or mitigate the
effects of an impairment should be taken into account in assessing whether the individual has a
disability under the Act. After the ADA became effective, the question soon arose as to whether
an individual who, for example, employed the use of a device such as a hearing aid or who took
medication to mitigate the effects of high blood pressure was substantially limited in a major life
activity, despite the fact that the person s use of mitigating or corrective measures helped
alleviate the effects of an impairment. The EEOC had taken the view, generally espoused in the
legislative history of the ADA, that the determination of whether an individual is substantially
limited in a major life activity must be made on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigating
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See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
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measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices.

110

By 1999, the majority of

federal courts had deferred to the EEOC s position on the matter.111
In 1999, the Supreme Court rejected the EEOC s position in Sutton v. United Airlines,
Inc. The Court concluded that the plain language of the ADA s definition of disability required
that a plaintiff s use of mitigating measures be considered when assessing whether the plaintiff s
impairment substantially limited a major life activity.112 To the Court, the statute s use of the
present indicative verb form in the phrase substantially limits mandated that a plaintiff s
impairment must presently substantially limit a major life activity it is not enough that the
impairment might, could, or would be substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not
taken.

113

As the definition had a plain meaning according to the Court, the fact that the

legislative history and EEOC Interpretive Guidance suggested a contrary result was largely
irrelevant.114
2.

The Single-Job Rule and the Regarded as Prong

The other issue in Sutton was whether the petitioners, regardless of the existence of an
actual disability, had adequately alleged that United Air Lines regarded them as being
substantially limited in the major life activity of working.115 The Court s resolution of the issue
illustrates how the ADA s definition of disability has limited the reach of the statute. In cases
brought under the actual disability prong, the EEOC had concluded that in order to be
110

29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(j) (1998); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 (II), at 52 (1990), reprinted in
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See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 495-96 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112
Id. at 482.
113
Id.
114
See id. at 482.
25

substantially limited in the major life activity of working, it is not sufficient that an impairment
limits an individual s ability to perform a particular job. Instead, an individual must be precluded
from a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs.116 The difficulty for an ADA plaintiff who alleges
that an employer regarded the plaintiff as having a disability is that the definition refers a court
back to the actual disability prong: for a plaintiff to fit within the regarded as definition, the
defendant must regard the plaintiff as having such an impairment, i.e., an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity. Thus, read in this fashion, an ADA plaintiff who alleges
that an employer regarded the plaintiff as being substantially limited in the major life activity of
working must establish that the employer regarded the plaintiff as having an impairment that
precluded the individual, not just from the job in question, but from a class of jobs or a broad
range of jobs.
This is precisely the interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court in Sutton. In Sutton, the
petitioners had merely alleged that United Air Lines regarded them as being unable to perform
the job of a global airline pilot. 117 Therefore, at best, they had alleged that United regarded them
as being unable to perform a single job.118 As such, they had not alleged that they had a
disability within the meaning of the ADA. That same day, the Court handed down its decision in
Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.119 In Murphy, the Court applied the reasoning of Sutton to
conclude that an individual with hypertension that was controlled by medication did not have an
actual disability and that his employer did not regard him as being substantially limited in the
115
116
117
118

Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490.
29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3)(I) (1999); 29 C.F.R. app.
527 U.S. at 493.
See id.
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1630.2(j).

major life activity of working because it only viewed the individual as being precluded from
working at a particular job.120
3.

The Demanding Standard

Even where the mitigating measures and single-job rules are not implicated, ADA
plaintiffs face a difficult task in establishing the existence of a disability. Even prior to the
enactment of the ADA, there were several federal court decisions that expressed the view that the
Rehabilitation Act was designed to assure that truly disabled, but genuinely capable, individuals
will not face discrimination in employment .

121

This same basic sentiment was echoed by

Justice Ginsberg in Sutton, when she opined that individuals with correctable impairments did
not have disabilities within the meaning of the ADA because those individuals were not part of
the discrete and insular minority Congress sought to protect.122 And that sentiment found
perhaps its fullest voice in 2002 when, in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams,123 Justice O Connor, writing for a 9-0 majority, stated that the terms in the ADA s
definition of disability need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for
qualifying as disabled .
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In Toyota Motor, the Court clarified that the word substantially in the phrase
substantially limits suggests considerable or to a large degree.
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Even if an ADA plaintiff

can establish that an impairment limits a life activity to a large degree, the plaintiff still must
119
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establish that the life activity in question is major, or, as the Supreme Court has defined the
term, of central importance to daily life.

126

Numerous ADA plaintiffs with fairly serious

impairments have been unable to satisfy the ADA s demanding standard for qualifying as
disabled either because they were not substantially limited in a major life activity or because the
life activity they were substantially limited in was not major.127 The Court s explicit
pronouncement in Toyota Motor that the terms within the definition of disability must be
interpreted strictly is likely to contribute to the overall trend of pro-defendant outcomes on the
question of the existence of a disability under the ADA.128
4.

The Special Problem of Individuals with Psychiatric Disabilities

The ADA’s definition of disability poses particular challenges for individuals with mental
impairments. Given the public’s general fear over mental illness, individuals with mental
disabilities are perhaps more likely to face discrimination in the form of stereotyping, fear, and
avoidance than are individuals with physical disabilities.129 Of course, these were exactly the
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types of uninformed reactions to individuals with disabilities that Congress sought to address in
enacting the ADA. However, the ADA’s functional definition of disability has perhaps imposed
even more obstacles for individuals with mental disabilities seeking redress under the ADA than
it has for individuals with physical disabilities.130
Individuals with psychiatric disabilities, such as depression, bipolar disorder, or posttraumatic stress disorder, have faced particularly difficult challenges.131 First, some courts have
refused to recognize certain activities, such as concentrating or interacting with others, that are
likely to be affected by a psychiatric impairment as constituting “major” life activities.132
Instead, some courts have analyzed claims involving difficulties in concentrating or interacting
with others as being subsumed within the major life activity of working.133 If the individual’s
condition is aggravated solely by the individual’s workplace environment, the single-job rule
may work to exclude the individual from coverage.134 Second, while it might be a fairly simple
matter for an individual with a psychiatric condition to establish that a workplace was permeated
with stereotypical attitudes about psychiatric conditions, the Supreme Court’s literal reading of
the ADA’s “regarded as” prong has made it difficult for such individuals to establish that an
employer regarded the individual as being substantially limited in a particular major life
activity.135 Third, Sutton’s mitigating measures rule may work to exclude individuals receiving
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psychiatric treatment or medication to limit the effects of their psychiatric condition.136 Finally,
the intermittent nature of some psychiatric conditions may make it more difficult for individuals
to establish that a condition substantially limits a major life activity.137
B.

Decisions Concerning the Reasonable Accommodation Requirement

Although the ADA s definition of disability has generated significant controversy and has
limited the potential reach of the statute, the existence of a disability is only one piece of the
ADA puzzle. Even if an individual has a disability, the individual still must be qualified, i.e.,
capable of performing, with or without a reasonable accommodation, the essential functions of
the position held or desired.138 And, even if the employee can meet this standard, an employer is
not required to provide such an accommodation when it would result in an undue hardship on the
operation of the employer s business.139 Thus, questions as to the meaning of the terms
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship have also arisen quite frequently.
Prior to the ADA, most private employers had never been required by federal law to
spend any money or otherwise alter their employment practices in order to accommodate
employees with disabilities.140 Thus, one might have expected Congress or the EEOC to provide
fairly detailed guidelines for employees and employers to follow as to when an accommodation
is reasonable and when a reasonable accommodation nonetheless imposes an undue hardship

who had been called “Psycho Bob,” “crazy as hell,” and a “psychopath” by co-workers could not
proceed under a hostile environment theory because the employer did not regard employee as
having a disability).
136 Stefan, supra note 129, at 281.
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on the employer.141 Indeed, while Congress was considering the ADA, business groups pressed
for concrete standards to define these terms, including the use of mathematical formulas based on
the cost of an accommodation vs. an employee s annual salary.142 However, Congress failed to
define the term reasonable accommodation at all, opting instead to provide a non-exhaustive
list of possible reasonable accommodations.143 And while Congress defined undue hardship
generally to mean an action requiring significant difficulty or expense and provided several
factors to consider in making a determination on the question, neither Congress nor the EEOC
did anything to define more precisely this somewhat vague term.144
Given this lack of specificity, the reasonable accommodation requirement has been the
subject of considerable controversy.145 In its Interpretive Guidance, the EEOC explained that the
reasonable accommodation requirement is best understood as a means by which barriers to the
equal employment opportunity of an individual with a disability are removed or alleviated.

146

Despite this categorization of the reasonable accommodation requirement as a means of insuring
equal opportunity, critics have charged that some courts are reluctant to give full effect to the
requirement because they view it as creating special rights for individuals with disabilities.147
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At the same time, courts and commentators have raised concerns that the requirement has the
capacity to undermine the legitimate interests of employers and adversely impact other
employees.148
Certain accommodations, such as the reallocation of job duties and extended leaves of
absence, have the potential to force other employees to assume unwanted job duties.149 The
accommodation of reassignment to a vacant position has proven particularly controversial. The
federal courts have split on several reassignment issues, including whether an employer is
required to reassign a disabled employee when the employee is not necessarily the best-qualified
individual for the position;150 whether an employer is required to reassign a disabled employee to
a vacant position in contravention of a collective bargaining agreement provision;151 and whether
an employer is required to reassign a disabled employee to a vacant position in contravention of
an employer s unilaterally-imposed seniority rule.152
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In 2002, the Supreme Court addressed the ADA s reasonable accommodation requirement
for the first time in US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett.153 The case involved a disabled employee s
request to be reassigned to a vacant position, despite the fact that a more senior employee was
entitled to the position under the employer s unilaterally-imposed seniority policy.154 The Court
held that such a reassignment is ordinarily unreasonable.155 However, the Court left open the
possibility that an ADA plaintiff could demonstrate special circumstances that warrant a
finding that such an accommodation is reasonable despite the existence of a seniority system.156
Those special circumstances could include the fact that an employer departs from the policy so
frequently or that the policy is already so filled with exceptions that one more departure is
unlikely to upset the settled expectations of other employees.157 Thus, to the extent that Barnett
offered a chance for the Court to provide future litigants with a bright-line rule, the decision
failed to achieve that goal.158
C.

Criticisms and Calls for Reform

1.

Criticisms

In recent years, there has been an avalanche of criticism concerning court decisions under
the ADA. The criticism typically centers on the courts interpretation of the ADA and/or the
language of the statute itself. Perhaps the most consistent criticism of the courts interpretation of
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the statute is that the interpretation given to the statute by the courts has resulted in a protected
class of much smaller size than Congress intended.159
The Sutton and Murphy decisions have been derided for taking what some view as an
overly formalistic approach to statutory interpretation, for refusing to extend the normal
deference to the views of the agency charged with enforcing the statute,160 and for relying on the
discredited medical model of disability.161 As a practical matter, the development of a
demanding standard has resulted in a number of potential Catch-22 situations for ADA
plaintiffs.162 Under the mitigating measure rule of Sutton, an individual who takes medication or
uses mitigating devices may not be disabled enough to meet the demanding standard for
qualifying as disabled. If the individual does not employ such mitigating measures, the effects of
an individual s impairment may be severe enough that the individual is no longer qualified, i.e.,
capable of performing the essential functions of the position.163 Under the single-job rule, the
effects of an individual s impairment might be severe enough for an employer to regard the
individual as being unable to work at a particular job, but not severe enough to cause the
employer to regard the individual as being precluded from a broad class of jobs.164 Even where
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these rules do not operate to exclude a plaintiff from coverage, plaintiffs still face a difficult task
in satisfying the demanding standard the ADA s definition of disability imposes.
The most common complaint of those who take issue with the ADA s definition of
disability is with the statute s requirement that an impairment must substantially limit a major life
activity. Some critics argue that by focusing on the extent of an individual s impairment, the
ADA s functional definition of disability places the focus on the wrong place.165 Traditional antidiscrimination laws focus primarily on the actions of the defendant-employer s actions, not the
characteristics of the plaintiff-employee.166 Thus, it is illegal for an employer to discriminate on
the basis of a characteristic (such as race); there is no inquiry as to the extent of the characteristic
the plaintiff possesses.167 In contrast, before an ADA plaintiff can pass through the statute s gate,
the individual must establish that he or she is truly disabled.
Others have suggested that although the functional approach of inquiring whether an
impairment substantially limits a major life activity makes some sense when defining whether an
individual has an actual disability, it makes little sense to include the same language in the
statute s second and third prongs.168 According to these authors, the substantial limitation
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provide an accommodation for an individual without an actual disability), rev d, 142 F.3d 138
(3d Cir. 1998); Michelle A. Travis, Leveling the Playing Field or Stacking the Deck? The
Unfair Advantage Critique of Perceived Disability Claims, 78 N.C. L. REV. 901, 943-44
(2000) (noting that Congress viewed the reasonable accommodation requirement as a way of
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language of the actual disability prong is directly linked to the reasonable accommodation
language in the statute: an individual with an actual, functional limitation may not capable of
performing the essential functions of the position without an accommodation, but is perfectly
capable of doing so with such an accommodation. Therefore, in keeping with the ADA s goal of
equality of opportunity, employers should have to make reasonable accommodations for such
individuals.169 However, because employers are required to spend money or otherwise alter their
existing practices in order to reasonably accommodate the known disabilities of such individuals,
it makes sense to limit the number of instances where employers might be required to do so.170
Thus, the substantial limitation language of the first prong effectively limits the number of
people who can claim a right to such modifications and limits the burden on employers and
might arguably justify a strict interpretation.
In contrast, an employee who does not have an actual, current impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity has no need for an accommodation. An individual who is
capable of performing the essential functions of a position without an accommodation does not
seek special treatment; such an individual simply seeks to be treated like other employees.171 As
such, these kinds of ADA plaintiffs are virtually indistinguishable from plaintiffs who seek relief
from discrimination under Title VII. Yet, under the ADA, an employer may refuse to hire an
individual who does not have a substantially limiting impairment based solely on the employer s
irrational negative reactions to, or misperceptions about, the individual s impairment, as long as
enabling those with substantially limiting impairments to compete in conventional workplaces
designed for those without such impairments).
169
Stefan, supra note 129, at 298; Travis, supra note 159, at 944.
170
Stefan, supra note 129, at 300-01.
36

the employer does not regard the individual as having an impairment that substantially limits a
major life activity. As mentioned, at the time of the ADA s inception, the second and third
prongs of the ADA s were understood to protect individuals from exactly those types of
thoughtless decisions.172
While the ADA s definition of disability has created numerous problems, Congress
failure to more clearly define the scope of an employer s reasonable accommodation duty may
have contributed to the problem that plaintiffs have in establishing the existence of a disability.
One of the more plausible explanations for the courts strict interpretations of the definition of
disability is that courts have created a high disability threshold in order to avoid having to decide
difficult reasonable accommodation issues.173 According to this theory, because Congress failed
to provide courts with any meaningful guidance as to when a proposed accommodation is
reasonable or imposes an undue hardship, courts have been reluctant to permit plaintiffs to pass
the disability gate, lest they be forced to delve into the minutia of the workplace with little more
to go on than an abstract notion of reasonableness.174 This concern would seem to be particularly
acute when a proposed accommodation potentially impacts other employees or cuts deeply into
employer discretion.
2.

Calls for Reform

It is clear that there is a widespread sense of dissatisfaction with the current state of case
law under the ADA, at least among academics. What is less clear is what should be done about
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172
173
174

Id. at 298.
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 136, at 321.
See id. at 336-37.
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it. Aside from general suggestions that courts should interpret the ADA differently than they
have in the past, commentators have suggested numerous revisions to the language of the ADA
itself. Some of the proposed modifications are relatively conservative. Others are more radical.
On the more conservative end is the suggestion that the word substantially be
eliminated from the ADA s definition of disability.

175

This approach, Professor Cheryl L.

Anderson argues, would eliminate many of the interpretational problems associated with all three
prongs of the ADA s definition.176 In a similar vein, Professor Chai Feldblum has suggested that
the basic definition could be left intact, but that it could be amended by adding a series of
constructions to the phrases substantially limits and major life activities that would
effectively undo some of the Supreme Court s restrictive interpretations of those terms.177
Moving farther along the spectrum of reform, several authors recently suggested that the
Act be amended so that the EEOC is empowered to publish medical standards for determining
when the most common mental and physical impairments are severe enough to be considered
disabilities under the ADA.178 Under this approach, the EEOC would consult medical practice
guidelines and standard diagnostic and treatment protocols to aid in the establishment of medical
criteria.179 An individual who satisfied the criteria would be presumptively covered under the
Act.180 The fact that an individual has a condition that is included in the EEOC’s list of
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Anderson, supra note 138, at 129.
Id. at 128-29, n. 239.
177
For example, Professor Feldblum has suggested, by legislative amendment, doing away with
the mitigating measures rule and redefining the term substantially limits to mean having a
measurable effect on. Feldblum, supra note 23, at 162.
178
See Rothstein, et al., supra note 153, at 244.
179 Id. at 271.
180
Id. The authors argue that because it would be impossible to include every medical
176
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qualifying medical conditions would not automatically necessitate a finding of disability,
however. Instead, the employer retains the ability to demonstrate through clear and convincing
evidence that the impairment does not substantially limit a major life activity.181 Similarly, an
individual with an impairment that is not included in the list could still demonstrate the existence
of a disability by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the impairment
substantially limits a major life activity.182 Despite the reliance on a primarily medical standard
for determining the existence of a disability, the amended Act would retain the record of and
regarded as prongs.183 In addition to providing greater clarity regarding the definition of
disability, the authors argue that such an approach would have the benefit of being politically
viable because the new definition would continue to exclude minor impairments from
coverage.184
Others have suggested a more radical approach.185 Professors Chai Feldblum and Lisa
Eichhorn have separately proposed that the ADA s prohibition against discrimination against
qualified individuals with a disabilities be eliminated and replaced with a prohibition against
discrimination on the basis of disability.

186

Thus, the ADA would essentially mirror Title VII

in this respect by placing the focus on the employer s reasons for an adverse action, rather than

condition, the regulation’s list of conditions should be nonexclusive. Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183
Id. at 273.
184
Id. at 270.
185
For example, Professor Jane Byeff Korn has suggested that the ADA be amended so that
disability is defined as any physical or mental impairment that is associated with stigma, thus
eliminating the distinction between the actual disability prong and the record of and regarded as
prongs. Korn, supra note 20, at 448.
186
Feldblum, supra note 23, at 163; Eichhorn, supra note 23, at 1473.
39

on the severity of an individual s impairment.187 Disability would then be defined by
eliminating any reference to substantial limitations of major life activities and would instead be
defined as any physical or mental impairment, a record of such an impairment, or a perceived
impairment.188 If an employer takes an adverse action against an applicant or employee because
of a physical impairment or the perception of an impairment, the employer would be liable unless
it had a legitimate reason for doing so.189 Under Eichhorn s approach, the reasonable
accommodation requirement would essentially remained unchanged because, among other
reasons, the requirement only exists when an impairment limits an individual s ability to perform
a job or to be eligible for benefits and privileges of employment on an equal basis with nondisabled people.190
Although most of the discussion concerning reform of the ADA has centered around
revising the statute s definition of disability or eliminating the statute s protected-class
approach toward disability discrimination, several authors have suggested legislative clarification
of the reasonable accommodation and undue hardship concepts.191 For example, Steven B.
Epstein has suggested a formula, based upon an employer s net profit and total number of
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See Eichhorn, supra note __, at 1474 ( The wrongness of [disability] discrimination does not
depend on how severe the impairments are ..... ).
188
Feldblum, supra note 23, at 163; Eichhorn, supra note 23, at 1473.
189
Eichhorn, supra note 23, at 1473.
190
Id. at 1476.
191
Epstein, supra note 36, at 446-64; Jeffrey O. Cooper, Comment, Overcoming Barriers to
Employment: The Meaning of Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1454 (1991); Julie Brandfield, Note,
Undue Hardship: Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 113,
131 (1990).
40

employees, for determining when an accommodation would impose an undue hardship.192
Epstein s proposal does not, however, address those situations where providing a reasonable
accommodation would impose non-monetary costs on an employer or other employees.193

IV. THE CONCEPTION OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION AT THE STATE LEVEL
Because the states are not bound by the ADA s definition of disability, states are free to
experiment with their own definitions of disability and their own solutions to the problem of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities. In some instances, state legislatures have
chosen to depart from the model of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA and charted their own
courses. In other instances, state legislatures have modeled their anti-discrimination statutes after
the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA.
A. Pre-ADA Conceptions of Disability
By 1980, 38 states and the District of Columbia had statutes prohibiting disability-based
discrimination.194 Thirty-four of these states outlawed discrimination in the private employment
sector.195

In this sense, the majority of the states were at least ten years ahead of the federal

government.
There was considerable variety in the approaches taken by the states both in defining the
concept of disability and in defining the scope of an employer s obligations. Only two states
192

Epstein, supra note 36, at 454-55.
Id. at 397 n.22.
194
See Terry L. Leap, State Regulation and Fair Employment of the Handicapped, 5 EMP.
RELATIONS L.J. 382, 382 (1979-80); Maureen O Connor, Note, Defining Handicap for
Purposes of Employment Discrimination, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 633, 650 (1988).
195
See Leap, supra note 182, at 395-405. North Carolina only prohibited private employers
193
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had definitions of disability (or handicap ) that were modeled after the Rehabilitation Act s
definition.196 Most state statutes covered only current, actual impairments.197 A sizable number
covered only physical impairments and excluded individuals with mental impairments from the
statute s coverage.198 A slight majority of states defined disability through some reference to
the impairment s effect on employment.199 Thus, employees who had impairments that were
[]related to the ability to engage in a particular occupation
with the performance of the employee s duties

201

200

or that substantially interfere[d]

were not entitled to protection under a majority

of state statutes. Also common were laws that defined disability almost solely in terms of the
existence of an impairment or medical condition (often requiring verification by a physician,
psychiatrist, or psychologist) or that added the requirement that a disability must somehow be
substantial.

202

Thus, the medical model was still quite prevalent among the states by 1980.

Finally, few states explicitly provided for a reasonable accommodation requirement on the part of
from discriminating on the basis of sickle-cell trait. See id. at 401.
196
See O Connor, supra note 182, at 650 n.99.
197
See Leap, supra note 182, at 386, 395-405.
198
According to Leap, 15 states provided protection only for those with physical handicaps. Id.
at 384.
199
States that fall into this category clearly included Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Nevada, New
Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin. See id. at 395-405.
200
Id. at 397 (quoting Iowa s law).
201
Id. at 396 (quoting Georgia s law).
202
For example, in 1975 Maine amended its Human Rights Act to define physical or mental
handicap as any disability, infirmity, malformation, disfigurement, congenital defect or mental
condition caused by bodily injury, accident, disease, birth defect, environmental conditions or
illness; and also includes the physical or mental condition of a person which constitutes a
substantial handicap, as determined by a physician or, in the case of mental handicap, by a
psychiatrist or psychologist, as well as any other health or sensory impairment which requires
special education, vocational rehabilitation or related services. Maine Human Rights Comm n v.
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employers in their statutes, although at appears that, like at the federal level, the requirement was
addressed in at least some states through administrative interpretation.203
As case law under Section 504 began to develop, more states began to adopt statutes
prohibiting discrimination until, by the time of the ADA s enactment in 1990, 48 states and the
District of Columbia had statutes prohibiting disability-based discrimination in the private
sector.204 The addition of prohibitions on discrimination against individuals with disabilities into
existing state anti-discrimination statutes suggests an interplay between Congress and the states.
Only a few states used the Rehabilitation Act s definition of handicap as a model prior to
1980;205 however, between 1980 and 1990, as Rehabilitation Act case law began to develop,
more and more states began to make significant revisions to their statutory definitions and more
and more began to use the Rehabilitation Act s definition as a model.206 Indeed, in some cases,
the statutory revisions appear to have been motivated by a desire to create uniformity between a
state and the federal government.207 In addition, even in states that did not use Section 504 as a
guide, courts often looked to federal case law and administrative interpretations for guidance.208

City of South Portland, 508 A.2d 948, 952 (Maine 1986) (quoting statute).
203
See Leap, supra note 182, at 386 (noting that in Iowa, the law required an employer to make
reasonable accommodation to physical and mental limitations); Holland v. Boeing Co., 583 P.2d
621, 623-24 (Wash. 1978) (reading a reasonable accommodation requirement into the statute
based, in part, on the fact that the administrative regulations imposed such a requirement).
204
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
205
See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
206
See O Connor, supra note 182, at 651.
207
See Braun v. American Int l Health and Rehab. Serv., Inc., 846 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Or. 1993)
(quoting legislative history of amendment to Oregon s statute to the effect that the purpose of the
amendment was to conform the statutory definition ... more closely with the federal law using
Sections 503 and 504" of the Rehabilitation Act).
208
See O Connor, supra note 182, at 651.
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Thus, it seems clear that the Rehabilitation Act influenced the development of numerous state
laws regarding disability discrimination.
At the same time federal law was influencing the states, the states appeared to have
played a role in motivating Congress to extend protection from disability-discrimination to the
private sector. As mentioned, the states were ahead of the federal government in terms of
attempting to address discrimination against the disabled in the private sector.209 At the same
time, the ADA s Findings and Purposes and legislative history express the concern that, despite
the states efforts, state laws provided incomplete protection to many individuals with disabilities
who had experienced discrimination.210
Despite the influence of the Rehabilitation Act on state anti-discrimination law, at the
time of the ADA s enactment, there continued to be substantial diversity in terms of how the
states approached disability-based discrimination.211 By the late 1980s, the number of states that
were using the Rehabilitation Act s basic approach of defining a disability in terms of an
impairment that substantially limited a major life activity, while still not a majority, had grown
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See supra pg. 42 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. 12101(a)(4) (1994) (finding that individuals who have experienced
discrimination on the basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such
discrimination, ); 134 CONG. REC. 5090-02 (1988) (statement of Sen. Simon) (stating that state
laws were inconsistent and incomplete at the time of the ADA s introduction).
211
See O Connor, supra note 182, at 634.
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rapidly.212 By 1990, the number of states that explicitly included a reasonable accommodation
requirement in their statutes had grown to 27.213
B.

The Influence of the ADA on State Anti-Discrimination Law

The enactment of the ADA brought increased attention to the problem of disability
discrimination. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the creation of the ADA and the huge
growth in the amount of disability discrimination case law has prompted several states to take a
fresh look at the problem of disability discrimination.
1.

The Influence of the ADA on State Anti-Discrimination Statutes and
Administrative Interpretations in Defining Disability

212

For example, a 1988 survey found that 24 states relied primarily on Section 504's definition
as a model. Id. at 672. However, six of these states omitted either or both of the record of of
regarded as prongs from their definitions, thus limiting coverage to individuals with actual
disabilities. Id.
213
See Epstein, supra note 36, at 395 n.16. Four of theses states (Delaware, Louisiana, North
Carolina, and Virginia) defined reasonable accommodation somewhat differently than that
phrase had been interpreted under the Rehabilitation Act. See id.
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The enactment of the ADA has clearly had a strong influence on state anti-discrimination
statutes and interpretive regulations. With the exception of Alabama and Mississippi,214 every
state and the District of Columbia now has a statute prohibiting discrimination by private
employers against individuals with disabilities.215 In practice, approximately 37 states and the
District of Columbia use a three-pronged statutory definition of disability (or handicap) that is the
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These states prohibit discrimination in the public sector, but not in the private sector. See
ALA. CODE 21-7-8 (2002); MISS. CODE ANN. 43-6-15 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. 4333-560 (Law Co-op 2002).
215
ALASKA STAT. 18.80.220(a)(1) (Michie 2002); ARK. CODE ANN. 16-123-02(3)
(Michie 2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT 41-1463(F) (2002); CAL. GOVT. CODE 12940(a)(1)
(West 2002) ; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 24-34-402 (West 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. 46a-60(a)(1) (West 2002); 19 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, 724 (2002); D.C. CODE
ANN. 2-1401.11(1) (2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. 760.10(1)(a) (2002); GA. CODE ANN. 346A-4(2002); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. 378-2(1) (Michie 2002); IDAHO CODE 67-5909
(2002); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-102(A) (West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. 22-9-13(l) (Michie 2002); IOWA CODE ANN. 216.6(1) (West 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. 441000(a) (2002); KY REV. STAT. ANN. 344.020(1)(b) (Michie 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
23:323 (West 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, 4553(2-F), (8-D) (West 2002); MD.
CODE ANN. Art. 49B 5(b) (West 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, 4 (2002);
MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. 37.1202(1) (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. 363.03((2)
(West 2002); MO. REV. STAT. 213.055(1) (2002); MONT. CODE ANN. 49-2-303(1)(a)
(2002); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. 48-1104 (Michie 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
613.330(1) (2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 354-A:7(I) (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. 10:5-4.1
(West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. 28-1-7A (Michie 2002); N.Y. EXEC. LAW 296(1) (2003);
N.C. GEN. STAT. 168A-5(a)(1) (2002); N.D. CENT. CODE 14-02.4-03 (2002); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. 4112.02(A) (West 2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, 1302(A)(1) (West
2002) OR. REV. STAT. 659A.112(1) (2002); 659A.115 (2002); 43 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. 955(a) (West 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS 28-5-7(1) (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. 1-1380(A)(1) (Law Co-op 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 20-13-10 (Michie 2002); TENN. CODE
ANN. 8-50-103(a) (2002); TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. 21.051 (2002); UTAH CODE ANN.
34A-5-106(1) (2002); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, 495(a)(1) (2002); VA. CODE ANN. 51.541(Michie 2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 49.60.180 (West 2003); W. VA. CODE 5-119 (2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. 111.34 (West 2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. 27-9-105(a)(i)(d)
(West 2003).
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same or substantially similar to the definitions of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.216 In
several of these states, the relevant statute is silent or unclear as to the definition of disability, but
the appellate courts or administrative agencies charged with enforcing the statute have borrowed
the definition of handicap or disability contained in the Rehabilitation Act or ADA.217 In
several states with statutes that parallel the ADA, the definitions were amended shortly after the
passage of the ADA.218

216

See Appendix. Within this category, there are occasionally variations on the ADA s threepronged definition. For example, Alaska employs the ADA s three-pronged definition, but also
extends coverage to impairments that require the use of a prosthesis, special equipment for
mobility, or service animals. ALASKA STAT. 18.80.300(12)(D).
217
See Appendix.
218
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. 41-1461(4) (1992) (amended 1994) (quoted in Francini v.
Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 937 P.2d 1382, 1391 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).
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Five states utilize the ADA s definition as a model, but have altered the ADA s threepronged approach in some manner to either limit or broaden the scope of coverage: Arkansas has
neither a record of nor a regarded as prong;219 Virginia has both an actual and a record of
prong, but not a regarded as prong;220 and in Georgia, an individual must have a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits a major life activity and a record of such
impairment, but there is no regarded as prong;221 As discussed in greater detail infra,
Minnesota s statute defines a disability in terms of a material limitation, rather than a
substantial limitation,”222 whereas California uses the ADA s three-pronged definition but has
expanded that definition by requiring only that an impairment limit (rather than substantially
limit) a major life activity.223
Three states employ definitions of disability that are more in line with the old medical
model of disability and bear little resemblance to the definitions found in the Rehabilitation Act
and the ADA.224 In two of these states, disability is defined primarily in terms of medical
conditions, infirmities, malformations, or disfigurements that are determinable.

225

Despite the

reliance on a primarily medical, rather than functional, definition, each of these three states allow
plaintiffs to proceed by establishing that the employer regarded them as having a disability, either
through statute or decisional law.226 New York employs a hybrid definition that has
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ARK. CODE ANN. 16-123-02(3) (Michie 2002).
VA. CODE ANN. 51-5.3 (Michie 2002).
GA. CODE ANN. 34-6a-2(3); Hennly v. Richardson, 444 S.E.2d 317, 320 n.2 (Ga. 1994).
MINN. STAT. ANN. 363.01(13) (West 2002).
CAL. GOVT. CODE 12926(i), (k) (West 2002).
See Appendix.
See Appendix.
See Appendix.
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characteristics of both the older medical model and the ADA s functional, civil rights
approach.227 Finally, Washington has a definition that is difficult to classify and has no real
parallel.228
In states that use the Rehabilitation Act or ADA as a model, courts have routinely
imported federal decisional law when interpreting their own parallel statutes. With only a few
exceptions,229 state courts have found federal disability law jurisprudence persuasive. Thus, in
virtually every jurisdiction that has considered the questions, the ADA s mitigating measures and
single-job rules have been incorporated into state law.230
2. The Influence of the ADA on State Anti-Discrimination Statutes and Administrative
Interpretations in Defining A Reasonable Accommodation
The differences between the state and federal levels with respect to defining the scope of
an employer s reasonable accommodation duty are perhaps greater than the differences with
respect to defining the concept of disability. Interestingly, a significant number of states do not
utilize the ADA s protected-class approach of limiting coverage to qualified individuals with
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See Appendix.
See Appendix.
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See Dahill v. Police Dept. of Boston, 748 N.E.2d 956, 963 (Mass. 2001) (refusing to construe
identically-worded statute to require the consideration of mitigating measures as the Supreme
Court had in Sutton); Stone v. St. Joseph s Hospital of Parkersburg, 538 S.E.2d 389 (W. Va.
2000) (criticizing the single-job rule articulated in Sutton and Murphy and holding that the fact
that the plaintiff had presented evidence to establish that he had been treated by the employer as
a person who should not be entrusted with the duties of his regular job was sufficient evidence
from which a jury could conclude that the employer regarded the plaintiff as being substantially
limited in the major life activity of working); Pulcino v. Federal Express Corp., 9 P.3d 787
(Wash. 2000) (refusing to import ADA s definition of disability into state statute and devising a
much broader definition of disability that allowed a plaintiff with a temporary impairment to
proceed).
230
See, e.g., Grant v. May Dept. Stores Co., 786 A.2d 580, 584-85 (D.C. 2001) (adopting
Sutton s mitigating measures and single-job rules).
228
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disabilities. Instead, many simply include disability among other characteristics (such as race,
gender, etc.) upon which it is illegal to base employment decisions.231 Some statutes do clarify
that it is not a discriminatory practice to take adverse employment action against an individual
with a disability who cannot perform the essential functions of a job, even with a reasonable
accommodation.232 In other instances, however, there is no such clarification, nor is there in
some instances an explicit requirement that employers must make reasonable
accommodations.233 Therefore, it has been up to the courts to clarify that employers are free to
deny employment to individuals with disabilities who cannot perform the essential functions of a
job or to otherwise graft a reasonable accommodation requirement onto the statute.234
The greater attention to the problem of disability discrimination brought about the
passage of the ADA seems to have spurred some states to impose a reasonable accommodation
requirement upon employers where none had existed before. For example, prior to the ADA s
passage in 1990, Michigan defined the term disability by reference to an impairment that
substantially limited a major life activity and was unrelated to the individual's ability to perform
the duties of a particular job or position, or [was] unrelated to the individual's qualifications for
employment or promotion."235 Michigan courts had interpreted this definition to mean that an
employer did not have any duty to accommodate an employee with a disability if the employee s
231

See, e.g., IDAHO CODE 67-5909 (2002).
See, e.g., id.
233
See Moody-Herrera v. Dept. of Nat. Resources, 967 P.2d 79, 87 n.39, n.40 (Alaska 1998)
(listing states that do not have an explicit reasonable accommodation requirement in their
statutes, but whose courts have relied on state regulations requiring such accommodations or
found an implied statutory duty to make such accommodations).
234
See id.
235
Carr v. General Motors Corp., 389 N.W.2d 686, 688 (Mich. 1986) (quoting statute), amended
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disability impeded job performance.236 In other words, an employer did not have to provide an
accommodation when an accommodation was actually needed.237 In 1990 (the year of the ADA s
passage), the Michigan legislature amended its definition of disability so that it included a
reference to the ability of an individual to perform the duties of a particular job with or without a
reasonable accommodation, thus generally brining the statute into line with federal law.238
Despite the influence of the ADA, the differences between the state and federal models
with respect to the reasonable accommodation concept are perhaps greater than the differences in
the definitions of disability. Some states impose a lesser duty on employers to make
accommodations. For example, while Iowa s statute imposes a reasonable accommodation duty
on employers, the Iowa Supreme Court has interpreted the statute by reference to an employer s
obligation under Title VII to reasonably accommodate an employee s religious practices. Thus,
as a general matter, an employer is not required to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to
accommodate an individual with a disability239 -- a standard specifically rejected by Congress in
enacting the ADA.240
In most states that impose a lesser accommodation duty on employers, the difference in
standards is largely attributable to the fact that the Rehabilitation Act, rather than the ADA,
served as the model for the state statute. As discussed, federal courts had almost uniformly
on rehearing in part by 393 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1986).
Carr, 389 N.W.2d at 688-90; Hatfield v. St. Mary s Med. Ctr., 535 N.W.2d 272, 274 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1995).
237
Carr, 389 N.W.2d 688.
238
MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. 37.1103(l)(i) (West 2002); Rourk v. Oakwood Hosp. Corp.,
580 N.W.2d 397, 400 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
239
Cerro Gordo County Care Facility v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm n, 401 N.W.2d 192, 197 (Iowa
1987).
236
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concluded that an employer had no duty to reassign an employee with a disability to a vacant
position under the Rehabilitation Act.241 A significant number of states continue to employ the
Rehabilitation Act s definition of a qualified individual with a disability, rather than the ADA s
definition.242 Thus, in these states the issue is whether an individual can perform the essential
functions of the position for which the individual was hired or from which the individual was
fired. As a result, the courts in these states have almost uniformly concluded that an employer is
not required to reassign an employee with a disability to a vacant position.243
Still other states have defined the scope of an employer s reasonable accommodation with
greater specificity. A few states have chosen to define the concepts of reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship by reference to mathematical formulas or dollar limits.244
In Delaware, for example, if the cost of accommodating a new employee would exceed 5 percent
of the annual salary or annualized hourly wage of the job in question, the accommodation
imposes an undue hardship.245 Others have taken steps to alleviate concerns that the reasonable
accommodation requirement amounts to preferential treatment of individuals with disabilities at
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Malloy, supra note 10, at 628.
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the expense of other employees. Several states have clarified that the reasonable accommodation
duty does not require an employer to prefer a less-qualified disabled employee over a betterqualified, non-disabled employee,246 to deviate from a bona fide seniority policy or practice,247 or
to reassign job duties of a disabled employee where the reassignment would significantly
increase the skill, effort or responsibility required of another employee from that required prior to
the change in duties.248

V.

THE INFLUENCE OF STATE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ON FEDERAL LAW?
Assuming for the sake of argument that legislative revision of the ADA is desirable, the

various approaches of the states may serve as models for federal reform. The extent to which
such law can serve as a model for federal legislation depends on a number of factors, not the least
of which is the extent to which the model is politically viable.249 As mentioned, a number of
states take an approach toward remedying disability discrimination that is markedly different
than those taken by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.250 In most instances, the current
versions pre-date the ADA, and, either through conscious decision or legislative inertia, these
states have resisted the temptation to bring their statutes into accord with federal legislation. By
contrast, the statutes of California and Rhode Island were recently amended in direct response to
some of the Supreme Court s restrictive interpretations of the ADA. Of particular note is the fact
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that for several of the suggested revisions to the ADA proposed by commentators,251 there are
states that employ a rough parallel. Thus, these states provide working models for possible
revision to the ADA that can be studied in order to evaluate their overall effectiveness.
A.

State Law as a Model for Amending the ADA s Definition of Disability

1.

California s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Rhode Island s Fair
Employment Practices Act, and Minnesota’s Human Rights Act: Alternatives to
the ADA

a.

Altering the ADA’s Definition

To date, California and Rhode Island are the only states whose legislatures have amended
their statutes, in part, in direct response to the United States Supreme Court s interpretation of the
ADA.252 Even prior to the Supreme Court s Sutton and Murphy decisions in 1999, California s
statutory definition of disability in the employment discrimination context differed from that of
the ADA. In 1992, the year the ADA became effective, California amended its Fair Employment
and Housing Act253 to substitute the phrase physical disability for physical handicap, and
generally modeled the definition of disability after the ADA s definition.254 However, rather than
requiring that an impairment substantially limit a major life activity, the FEHA simply required
that an impairment limit major life activities.255 Despite the less stringent standard that appeared
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in the text, several California courts had nonetheless spoken in terms of substantial limitations
when addressing disability discrimination claims brought under the FEHA.256 In 2000, the
California legislature amended the FEHA to clarify that, notwithstanding any decisional law to
the contrary, an impairment need only limit, rather than substantially limit a major life activity in
order to qualify as a disability.257
In addition, the California legislature also appears to have taken direct aim at the Supreme
Court s interpretation of the ADA. The amendment explicitly provided that although the ADA
provides a floor of protection, [California s] law has always, even prior to the passage of [the
ADA] afforded additional protections

258

and that the requirement of a limitation, rather than a

substantial limitation, was intended to result in broader coverage under [California law] than
under [the ADA].
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Importantly, the amendment specifically directed courts to disregard the

mitigating measures and single-job rules established by the United States Supreme Court when
interpreting the FEHA. The amendment provides that whether a condition limits a major life
activity shall be determined without respect to any mitigating measures, unless the mitigating
measure itself limits a major life activity and that working is a major life activity, regardless of
whether the actual or perceived working limitation implicates a particular employment or a class
or broad range of jobs.
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determined without regard to the availability or use of mitigating measures, such as reasonable
accommodations, prosthetic devices, medications, or auxiliary aids.

261

Minnesota’s Human Rights Act also differs slightly from the ADA in the sense of
requiring a material limitation of a major life activity, rather than a substantial limitation. On its
face, the difference seems only minimal. However, the Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that
the definition is less stringent than the ADA’s definition.262 The extent to which the definition is
actually less stringent in practice is subject to debate, as the court has applied the Supreme
Court’s single-job in concluding that an insulin-dependent diabetic did not have a disability
within the meaning of the Minnesota Human Rights Act.263
Thus, much like Professor Cheryl L. Anderson s proposal that the ADA be amended to
eliminate the reference to substantial limitations and Professor Chai R. Feldblum s suggestion
that the ADA be amended by adding a series of constructions to the phrases substantially limits
and major life activities that would effectively undo some of the Supreme Court s restrictive
interpretations of those terms,264 the legislatures of California, Minnesota, and Rhode Island have
limited some of the restrictive influence of federal decisional law. The California and Rhode
Island legislatures express instructions concerning the mitigating measures and single-job rules
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will almost certainly force those state courts that have adopted contrary positions265 to re-evaluate
those positions. Both amendments have only been in effect a short time, so it is still too early to
determine their impact. However, early results suggest that California plaintiffs may have an
easier time meeting the threshold requirement of the existence of disability than ADA plaintiffs
as a result of the California legislature s clarification. For example, in 1999 the United States
Supreme Court chided the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for being too quick to find that an
individual with monocular vision had a disability under the ADA,266 and several federal
decisions subsequently found that similarly-situated individuals did not have disabilities.267 In
contrast, a California appellate court in 2001 had little difficulty concluding that a similarlysituated individual had produced sufficient evidence that his visual impairment limited (rather
than substantially limited) him in the major life activity of seeing268
b.

Drawbacks

Amending the ADA s definition of disability in any of these fashions would face several
obstacles. While reversing the mitigating measures and single-job rules by legislative fiat is
perhaps the most conservative of the suggested approaches, such action would significantly
expand the ADA s coverage. Given the high success rates that employers currently enjoy, such
action could almost certainly be expected to face stiff resistance. Amending the definition to
265

See Hobson v. Raychem Corp., 86 Cal.Rptr. 497, 506 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
Albertson s Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 564 (1999).
267
See Flores v. American Airlines, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Hoehn
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require mere limitations, rather than substantial limitations, would likely generate even more
resistance for similar reasons. Perhaps more viable would be Minnesota’s approach of requiring
material, rather than substantial limitations. However, there are several drawbacks to such a
revision. First such a change would arguably amount to little more than hair-splitting -- if courts
are already inclined to interpret the ADA’s definition of disability in a narrow fashion, it is
difficult to see how such a minor change could have a substantial impact. Second, such a change
fails to address the mitigating measures and single-job rules.269 Finally, such a change would
provide less, rather than greater, clarity – a substantial drawback for a statutory definition that, in
its current form, has been criticized for being too vague.270
Moreover, some disability rights advocates would argue that simply tinkering with the
definition of disability in any of these fashions fails to address the key policy concerns for
prohibiting discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Professor Feldblum has argued
that the key policy question in any discrimination case is whether an employer based its decision
on a particular trait of the plaintiff and whether the employer was nonetheless justified in doing
so.271 Currently, so much of the focus in ADA cases is on whether an individual has a disability
that courts lose sight of this fundamental concern that underlies all anti-discrimination law.272 In
sum, because the ADA in its present form is so preoccupied with excluding from its coverage

review granted and opinion superseded by 33 P.3d 446 (Cal. 2001).
Sigurdson v. Carl Bolander & Sons Co., 532 N.W.2d 225, 229 (Minn. 1995) (applying
single-job rule).
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those who are not truly disabled, any changes to the definition of disability that do not address
this fundamental flaw fail to effectuate the true purposes of anti-discrimination law.
2.

The Medical, Civil Rights Approach

a.

The Medical, Civil Rights Approach of New Jersey and Connecticut

As mentioned, three states define disability almost exclusively in medical terms, rather
than in functional terms.273 All, however, also provide for protection from discrimination based
upon the perception that the individual has a disability.274 Thus, these states take both a medical
and civil rights approach to the problem of disability discrimination.
Of the three states, New Jersey and Connecticut are the most specific regarding which
types of impairments are considered disabilities.275 New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination
provides an illustrative list of conditions that qualify as a handicap. The statute defines a
person with a handicap as one who is
suffering from physical disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement which
is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness including epilepsy, and which
shall include, but not be limited to, any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of
physical coordination, blindness or visual impediment, deafness or hearing
impediment, muteness or speech impediment or physical reliance on a service or
guide dog, wheelchair, or other remedial appliance or device, or from any mental,
psychological or developmental disability resulting from anatomical, psychological,
physiological or neurological conditions which prevents the normal exercise of any
bodily or mental functions or is demonstrable, medically or psychologically, by
273

See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
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accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques. Handicapped shall also mean
suffering from AIDS or HIV infection.276
While the list is not as specific as it might be, it nonetheless includes numerous examples of the
types of conditions that the New Jersey legislature considered serious enough to constitute
disabilities.
Connecticut is even more specific in its description of a “mental disability.”277 Under
Connecticut’s 2001 amendment to its statute, an individual with a mental disability is one “who
has a record of, or is regarded as having one or more mental disorders, as defined in the most
recent edition of the American Psychiatric Association's ‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders. [DSM-IV]’"278 Thus, all a court is required to do is consult this source in
order to make the determination as to the existence of a mental disability.
In this sense, Connecticut’s statute and New Jersey s Law Against Discrimination
resemble the recent proposal by several authors to amend the ADA be amended so that the EEOC
is empowered to publish medical standards for determining when the most common mental and
physical impairments are severe enough to be considered disabilities under the ADA.279 While
New Jersey’s approach is not as specific as the authors’ proposed EEOC list of medical
conditions, it takes a similar approach in that it provides a non-exhaustive list of certain
conditions that are considered sufficiently severe to constitute disabilities. Connecticut’s
definition of mental disabilities is more rigid than the approach offered by the authors in the
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sense that there is no opportunity for an employer to contest a finding of disability if the
plaintiff’s condition happens to be one listed in the American Psychiatric Association's DSMIV.280
b.

New York s Medical, Functional, and Civil Rights Approach

New York s Human Rights Law (NYHRL) takes a somewhat different approach. New
York s Executive Law 292(21) defines a disability as follows:
(a) a physical, mental or medical impairment resulting from anatomical,
physiological, genetic or neurological conditions which prevents the exercise of a
normal bodily function or is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical
or laboratory diagnostic techniques or (b) a record of such an impairment
or c) a condition regarded by others as such an impairment, provided, however,
that in all provision of this article dealing with employment, the term shall be
limited to disabilities which, upon the provision of reasonable accommodations,
do not prevent the complainant from performing in a reasonable manner the activities
involved in the job or occupation sought or held.281
This definition incorporates elements of both the ADA s functional, civil rights approach
toward defining disability and the older medical approach. Like the ADA, the NYHRL takes a
civil rights approach toward the problem of disability discrimination in that an individual need
not have an actual impairment in order to proceed under the statute s record of or regarded as
prongs. The statute takes a functional approach toward defining disability that is somewhat
similar to the ADA in that an individual may have a disability if she has an impairment which
prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function .... However, this functional definition differs
from the ADA s definition in two important ways. First, the statute speaks in terms of normal
bodily function[s], not major life activities. Seemingly, this would make this part of the
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N.Y. EXEC. LAW 292(21) (2003).
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definition more expansive than the ADA s definition; the functions need not be major, i.e., of
central importance to daily life.

282

However, the statute s requirement that the impairment must

prevent[] (rather than substantially limit ) the exercise of such a function has been seized on
by several federal courts, which have stated that this portion of 296(21) s definition is actually
more restrictive than the ADA s functional definition.283 Under this reading of the statute, an
impairment must actually prevent the exercise of a normal bodily function, not simply
substantially limit it.284
The statute s alternative method of establishing the existence of a disability, however,
almost unquestionably provides more expansive coverage.285 If a plaintiff cannot establish that
an impairment functionally limits her, she still may be able to establish the existence of a
disability by proving that an impairment is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or
laboratory diagnostic techniques. This almost exclusively medical definition of disability
relieves a plaintiff of the burden of demonstrating any functional limitations resulting from an
impairment.
As is the case with the ADA, if a plaintiff proceeding under the NYHRL is able to satisfy
the relatively light burden of establishing the existence of a disability, she still must establish that

282

Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc. v. Williams, 122 S. Ct. 681, 691 (2002).
See, e.g., Aquinas v. Federal Express Corp., 940 F. Supp. 73, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
284
Hendler v. Intelecom USA, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 200, 210 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); cf. Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 691 ( an individual must have an impairment that prevents or
severely restricts the individual .... ).
285
See Ruhlman v. Ulster County Dept. Of Social Services, 234 F. Supp. 2d 140, 178 (N.D.N.Y.
2002) ( Despite a wealth of legislative history which seems to dictate otherwise, a disability is
defined much more broadly under NYHRL than it is under the ADA. ).
283

62

she was qualified for the position in question.286 Ultimately, a plaintiff still must establish that
the impairment, even upon the provision of reasonable accommodations, does not prevent her
from performing in a reasonable manner the activities involved in the job or occupation sought or
held.287 In this sense, the approach taken by the New York legislature is somewhat similar to the
approach advocated by Professor Feldblum and Professor Eichhorn, which would define a
disability simply as any physical or mental impairment, a record of such an impairment, or a
perceived impairment.288 In addition to the practical benefits for ADA plaintiffs, Feldblum and
Eichhorn argue that such an approach is in keeping with the goals of the ADA and antidiscrimination law more generally in that it places the focus on whether the employer had
legitimate reasons for taking the action it did rather than on the extent of an individual s
impairment..289
c.

Benefits and Drawbacks

The practical advantages for plaintiffs from a primarily medical, civil rights definition of
disability are obvious. For example, the NYHRL definition prevents a court from invoking the
mitigating measures rule of the ADA because, regardless of whether the individual uses
mitigating measures to correct the effects of the impairment, as long as the impairment itself still
exists and is demonstrable, the plaintiff has a disability.290 Moreover, because this part of the
definition does not speak to functional limitations, and because the statute does not exclude
286
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impairments that are related to the ability to engage in the activities involved in the particular job
in question,291 the single-job rule does not bar plaintiffs who proceed under the NYHRL.292
Connecticut’s definition of a mental disability provides similar advantages for plaintiffs.
Because Connecticut’s definition simply refers a court to an established list of mental conditions,
a plaintiff alleging the existence of a mental disability is relieved of the task of demonstrating any
functional limitation. Moreover, the fact that a plaintiff may proceed under a perceived disability
theory enables the statute to address the types of irrational fears and prejudices that the ADA was
designed to address – a concern that is particularly pronounced in the case of individuals with
mental impairments.293 While Connecticut’s definition has only been in existence for a few
years, early results suggest that the definition is likely to provide much greater coverage than
does the ADA.294
In sum, the anecdotal evidence suggests that a medical, civil rights definition is far more
expansive than the ADA s definition as evidenced by several decisions where plaintiffs were

the meaning of New York law even though they were not under the ADA).
See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
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See Ruhlman, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 177, 179 (concluding that single-job rule barred ADA
plaintiff from pursuing ADA claim, but that employer regarded the same plaintiff as being
disabled under New York law).
293 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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a mental disability by alleging that she was clinically depressed) with Heisler v. Metropolitan
Council, 339 F.3d 622, 630 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that plaintiff with major depressive disorder
did not have a disability under the ADA); compare Conway v. City of Hartford, No. CV
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mental disability) with 29 C.F.R. 1630.3(d) (2003) (stating that the ADA s definition of
disability does not include gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments).
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unable to establish that they had disabilities within the meaning of the ADA, but were able to
establish the existence of a disability within the meaning of New York state law.295 This
conclusion is bolstered by similarly pro-plaintiff decisions from other states that employ a
primarily medical definition.296 From an objective standpoint, a primarily medical definition of
disability would also immensely simplify the determination of the existence of a disability.
Courts would be relieved of the need of giving meaning to the ADA’s use of the words
“substantially” and “major” and could determine the existence of a disability simply by resorting
to a clear statutory definition or list of medical conditions.
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Standing alone, however, the approaches offered by Professors Eichhorn and Feldblum
are even less likely to be politically viable than some of the other proposed amendments to the
ADA.297 The primarily medical definition of disability employed by New York and a few other
states imposes a light burden on plaintiffs.298 If the results from discrimination cases in these
states are any indication of the likely results that would follow from a similar to change to the
ADA, such a change would have little chance of passage absent substantial changes to the ADA s
reasonable accommodation requirement. In this sense, it might be more politically viable to use
more concrete (and stringent) examples or criteria, such as those employed in New Jersey and
Connecticut. Even in these states, however, plaintiffs have enjoyed much greater success in
establishing the existence of a disability than have similarly-situated ADA plaintiffs.299
Reliance on a list of disabilities would potentially have other problems. Any such list
would run the risk of being over- or under-inclusive. If the definition affords a court no
flexibility in determining whether an individual has a disability, as is the case under
Connecticut’s definition, the definition may be over-inclusive in the sense that includes
conditions that legislators might not be enthusiastic about recognizing. For example, under
Connecticut’s definition of mental disability, certain mental conditions, such as gender identity
disorders, kleptomania, alcohol abuse, and pyromania, would all presumably be considered
disabilities because they are listed in the DSM-IV.300 These are also all conditions that are
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excluded from the ADA’s definition,301 presumably for political reasons. If the definition merely
included a list of representative conditions and allowed a court to make the ultimate disability
determination, as does New Jersey’s LAD, the benefits of predictability and certainty would be
lost as courts sought to fit certain conditions within the representative list or exclude them from
the list.
In this sense, the suggested approach of establishing a more comprehensive list of
qualifying conditions would represent an improvement. Moreover, such an approach might be
more politically viable if, as suggested, employers maintained the ability to rebut the presumption
of disability that would arise from a plaintiff having a condition that appears on the list by
establishing through clear and convincing evidence that the conditions does not substantially
limit a major life activity. This feature of the approach is certainly a drawback from a plaintiff’s
perspective. If an employer can rebut the disability presumption by bringing the inquiry back to
the employer-friendly standard of whether the condition substantially limits a major life activity,
it should logically be expected that employers would attempt to do just that in most cases. Thus,
it is debatable how much change such a revision might bring about in practice. At the same time,
however, the untested suggestion of establishing a clear and convincing standard might result in
more cases at least surviving summary judgment on the question of the existence of a disability.
Thus, because this approach takes away from employers with one hand, while giving to plaintiffs
with the other, it might be the approach with the greatest potential for adoption.
B.

301

Different Approaches to the Reasonable Accommodation Concept

29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(d) (2003).
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One of the lessons to be learned from the above discussion is that, absent a major political
realignment in Congress, any proposed change to the ADA’s definition of disability that would
result in broader coverage would probably need to be accompanied by a consequent change to the
scope of employers reasonable accommodation duty. One of the hypotheses suggested for the
Supreme Court s restrictive interpretations of the ADA s definition of disability is that the Court
has crafted its restrictive interpretations in an attempt to create a gatekeeping mechanism within
an inherently ambiguous legislative standard.

302

A lower threshold for the existence of a

disability would mean that more cases would hinge on whether the accommodation that would
enable the disabled employee to perform the essential functions of the job was reasonable (an
inherently ambiguous term), whether the provision of the accommodation imposed an undue
hardship (an ambiguous term as defined by Congress),303 or whether the employer could justify
the use of a facially-neutral policy or practice on the grounds of job-relatedness and business
necessity (a potentially highly demanding standard for an employer to meet).304
Amending the ADA s definition of disability so that it would be in keeping with New
York s definition, for example, without any clarification to the reasonable accommodation and
undue hardship standards would mean an increased burden on courts at the summary judgment
stage to sift through the minutiae of the workplace in an effort to determine the reasonableness of
a proposed accommodation.305 Although some bright-line rules regarding the reasonable
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accommodation requirement have developed through case law,306 Congress failed to provide
courts, employers, or employees with much guidance as to its meaning.307 Furthermore, such an
amendment might very well impose greater costs and burdens on employers, who, quite possibly,
would lose far more summary judgment motions than they currently do based on the inherently
fact-specific nature of the reasonable accommodation requirement.308 In sum, challenging the
existence of a disability is the easiest route to employer success, and employers would most
likely be highly reluctant to sacrifice this advantage without some concession on the part of
disability rights advocates on the issue of reasonable accommodation. As such, the key to
expanding the ADA’s coverage may actually be a clarification of and concomitant limitation on
the scope of employers’ reasonable accommodation duty.
To the extent changes to the ADA s reasonable accommodation and undue hardship
standards may be necessary to make revisions to the definition of disability more palatable to
employers, existing state statutes may provide some guidance. In an attempt to provide greater
certainty in the area and to address the cost concerns of employers, Congress could use the
mathematical formulas established in a few states as a model for changes to the undue hardship

governmentally-imposed rule defining job qualifications, courts will have no choice but to delve
into the factual minutia of each individual case. ).
306
See, e.g., Milton v. Scrivner, 53 F.3d 1118, 1124 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that an employer is
not required to reallocate essential job functions as a reasonable accommodation).
307
See Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 136, at 339-40.
308 Statistical analysis might be of considerable value in verifying the accuracy of this assertion.
As a matter of logic, however, it seems likely that if employers are deprived of their advantage in
disputing the existence of a disability, they would be far less likely to prevail on a pre-trial
motion to dismiss. Cf. Epstein v. Kalvin-Miller Intern., Inc., 100 F. Supp.2d 222, 229-30
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (granting summary judgment to employer on plaintiff’s ADA claim, but
denying summary judgment on NYHRL claim).
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standard.309 Other changes might also be necessary. As discussed, the most controversial
accommodation issues involve reassignment to a vacant position.310 To address the concern the
concern that this accommodation unduly limits the discretion of employers and creates special
rights for individuals with disabilities at the expense of other employees, Congress could look to
state statutes that address these concerns. The reasonable accommodation requirement could be
amended to clarify that an employer is not required to reassign an individual when there is
another, better-qualified employee for the position and/or when such reassignment would conflict
with the provisions of a bona fide seniority system.311 Finally, Congress could address similar
concerns more generally simply by clarifying, as a few states have, that an employer is not
required to reassign job duties of a disabled employee where the reassignment would
309

See supra notes 231-232 and accompanying text. Another possibility would be to define
“reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship” by reference to an employer s obligation
under Title VII to reasonably accommodate an employee s religious practices. Thus, an employer
would not required to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to accommodate an individual
with a disability. See supra notes 239-240 and accompanying text. Such a change is not
desirable. For one, the establishment of a de minimis standard in the context of religious
accommodation may have been necessary to avoid First Amendment problems. Malloy, supra
note 10, at 627. No such problem would exist with the ADA. Second, many accommodations
that would impose more than a de minimis cost can still be provided with little difficulty or
expense. See EEOC, Equal Employment Opportunities for Individuals with Disabilities, 56
FED. REG. 8578, 8583 (1991) (citing study that concluded that more than 80% of
accommodations cost less than $500).
310
See supra note 141and accompanying text.
311
See supra notes 233-234 and accompanying text. Another possibility would be to follow the
example of several states and eliminate the reassignment accommodation altogether. See supra
notes 229-230 and accompanying text. Again, such a change is not desirable. For one,
reassignment may be the last chance for an individual with a disability to remain employed and
for the ADA to satisfy its goal of assuring economic self-sufficiency. See 42 U.S.C.
12101(a)(8). In addition, reassignment, in some circumstances, might be more reasonable and
less onerous from an employer's perspective than any of the other forms of possible
accommodations listed in the ADA. See Fedro v. Reno, 21 F.3d 1391, 1399 (7th Cir. 1994)
(Rovner, J., dissenting) (quoting Ignacio v. United States Postal Service, Pet. No. 03840005,
70

significantly increase the skill, effort or responsibility required of such other employees from that
required prior to the change in duties.312
In addition to addressing the concerns of employers and other employees, such revisions
might also make courts more inclined to give full effect to the ADA s remedial purpose. If more
concrete standards were in place, and if those standards were perceived as being fairer to
employers and other employees, whatever concerns courts might have about interpreting the
ADA in a broad manner should largely be alleviated. As such, courts might be more inclined to
focus on the key question of whether an employer has discriminated against an individual rather
than on the extent of an individual s impairment and whether it is fair to require an employer to
provide a particular accommodation.

V.

CONCLUSION
There has been no shortage of proposals to amend the ADA in order to fulfill the statute s

initial promise. To date, however, the political will and a viable alternative have largely been
absent. If disability rights advocates are serious about seeking legislative revision of the ADA,
they have several models at the state level upon which they can draw for inspiration. By
examining the results of cases decided under state anti-discrimination statutes that define the
concept of disability in a manner different than the ADA, disability rights advocates can make a
more intelligent choice if and when they present an alternative to the ADA.
Fed.Equal Opportunity Rptr. 843159, at XII-84-264 (EEOC Sept. 4, 1984)).
312
See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
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At the same time, if any change to the ADA s definition of disability is proposed, it will
almost certainly have to be accompanied by changes to the reasonable accommodation
requirement. Again, state law provides several alternatives that might make any proposed
amendments to the ADA more politically viable. In sum, state solutions to the problem of
disability discrimination may prove to be an important resource in the continuing quest for
equality of opportunity for individuals with disabilities.
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Appendix
States In Which the Definition of Disability is the Same or Substantially Similar to the ADA
Alaska:

ALASKA STAT. 18.80.300(12) (Michie 2002) (also includes a condition
that may require the use of a prosthesis, special equipment for mobility, or
service animal).

Arizona:

ARIZ. REV. STAT 41-1461(2) (2002).

Colorado:

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

Delaware:

19 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, 722(4) (2002).

D.C.:

D.C. CODE ANN.

Florida:

FLA STAT. ANN. 760.10(1)(a) (2002) (prohibits discrimination based on
handicap, but fails to define the term); Greene v. Seminole Elec. Coop., Inc.,
701 So. 2d 646, 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (resorting to the definition of
handicap found in Florida s Fair Housing Act (FLA. STAT. ANN.
760.22(7), which parallels the ADA definition, to define the term).

Hawaii:

HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. 378-1 (Michie 2002).

Idaho:

IDAHO CODE
67-5902(15) (2002) (defines disability to mean a
physical or mental condition of a person, whether congenital or acquired,
which constitutes a substantial limitation to that person and is demonstrable
by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques. A person
with a disability is one who (a) has such a disability, or (b) has a record of
such a disability, or ) is regarded as having such a disability. ); IDAHO
ADMIN. CODE 45.01.01.010.13, .14 (2003) (defines disability by using
the ADA s definition).

Indiana:

IND. CODE ANN. 22-9-1-3 ) (Michie 2002) (requires a substantial
disability ); IND. CODE ANN. 22-9-5-27 (requires that the Illinois Civil
Rights Commission adopt rules that are not in conflict with the provisions of
the federal rules under the employment discrimination provisions of the
ADA).

24-34-301(2.5) (West 2002).

2-1401.02(5A) (2002).
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Iowa:

IOWA CODE ANN. 216.2 (West 2002) (requires a substantial disability );
Probasco v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm n, 420 N.W.2d 432, 434 (Iowa 1988)
(relying on administrative rules to define substantial disability in an
identical fashion to Rehabilitation Act and ADA).

Kansas:

KAN. STAT. ANN.

Kentucky:

KY REV. STAT. ANN.

Louisiana:

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 23:322(3) (West 2002).

Maine:

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, 4553(7-A), (7-B) (West 2002) (requires a
substantial disability ); Winston v. Maine Technical College System, 631
A.2d 70, 74-75 (Me. 1993) (relying on Maine Human Rights Commission s
definition which tracks the ADA); Doyle v. State Dept. Of Human Services,
2002 WL 1978907 (July 10, 2002 Me. Super. Ct.) (applying Maine Human
Rights Commission s definition).

Maryland:

MD. CODE ANN. Art. 49B 15(g) (West 2002) (any physical disability,
infirmity, malformation or disfigurement which is caused by bodily injury,
birth defect or illness including epilepsy, and which shall include, but not be
limited to, any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of physical coordination,
blindness or visual impairment, deafness or hearing impairment, muteness or
speech impediment or physical reliance on a seeing eye dog, wheelchair, or
other remedial appliance or device; and any mental impairment or deficiency
as, but not limited to, retardation or such other which may have necessitated
remedial or special education and related services); CODE OF MD REGS.
14.03.02.02(B)(6)(b) ( A physical or mental impairment, other than those
enumerated in B(6)(a) of this regulation, that is caused by bodily injury, birth
defect, or illness, which substantially limits one or more of an individual's
major life activities. ); State Comm n on Human Relations v. Anne Arundel
County, 664 A.2d 400, 405 n.5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (relying on
Maryland Commission on Human Relations definition, which tracks the
ADA).

Massachusetts:

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, 1(17) (2002).

Michigan:

MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. 37.1103(d)(i)(A) (West 2002) (must be
unrelated to the individual s qualifications for employment or promotion).

44-1002(j) (2002).
344.010(4) (Michie 2002).

Missouri:

MO. REV. STAT.
213.010(4) (2002) (impairment, with or without
reasonable accommodation, also must not interfere with performing the job).

Montana:

MONT. CODE ANN.

Nebraska:

NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.

48-1102(9) (Michie 2002).

Nevada:

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.

613.310(1) (2002).

New Hampshire:

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.

354-A:2(IV) (2002).

New Mexico:

N.M. STAT. ANN.

North Carolina:

N.C. GEN. STAT. 168A-3(7A) (2002).

North Dakota:

N.D. CENT. CODE 14-02.4-02(3) (2002).

Ohio:

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

Oklahoma:

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25,

Oregon:

OR. REV. STAT. 659A.100(1) (2002).

Pennsylvania:

43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 954(p.1) (West 2002).

Rhode Island:

R.I. GEN. LAWS 28-5-6(9) (2002) (but specifically states that
whether a person has a disability shall be determined without regard to the
availability or use of mitigating measures, such as reasonable
accommodations, prosthetic devices, medications, or auxiliary aids).

South Carolina:

S.C. CODE ANN.

South Dakota:

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 20-13-1(4) (Michie 2002) (must also be unrelated
to the ability to perform the major duties of a particular job or position or be
unrelated to the qualifications for employment or promotion).

Tennessee:

TENN. CODE ANN. 8-50-103 (2002) (prohibiting private discrimination
on the basis of handicap); Forbes v. Wilson County Emergency, 966 S.W.2d
417, 420 (Tenn. 1998) (holding that the definition of handicap in 8-50-103
is the same used in TENN. CODE ANN. 4-21-102(9)(A) (2002)); TENN.

49-3-101(3) (2002).

28-1-2(M) (Michie 2002).

4112.01(13) (West 2002).
1301(4) (West 2002).

1-13-30(N) (Law Co-op 2002)

CODE ANN. 4-21-102(9)(A) (2002) (defining handicap in parallel
fashion to ADA).
Texas:

TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. 21.002(6) (2002).

Utah:

UTAH CODE ANN. 34A-5-102(5) (2002) ( Disability means a physical
or mental disability as defined and covered by the Americans with
Disabilities Act .... ).

Vermont:

VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 21,

West Virginia:

W. VA. CODE 5-11-3(m) (2002).

Wisconsin:

WIS. STAT. ANN. 111.32(8) (West 2002) (physical or mental impairment
that makes achievement unusually difficult or limits the capacity to work, a
record of such impairment, or is perceived as having such an impairment);
Kitten v. State Dept. of Workforce Development, 644 N.W.2d 649, 661 (Wis.
2002) (stating that definition of disability found in ADA is virtually
identical).

Wyoming:

WYO. STAT. ANN. 27-9-101(a) (Michie 2002) (prohibits discrimination
on the basis of disability, but fails to define the term); WYO. RULES &
REG. EMP. LS CH. 10, 2 (2003) (uses Rehabilitation Act definition).

495d(5) (2002).

States That Use the ADA s Definition as a Model, But Have Altered the Definition
Arkansas:

ARK. CODE ANN.
regarded as prongs).

California:

CAL. GOVT. CODE 12926 (I), (k) (West 2002) (requires only a limitation
of a major life activity and specifically directs that [l]imits shall be
determined without regard to mitigating measures such as medications,
assistive devices, prosthetics, or reasonable accommodations, unless the
mitigating measure itself limits a major life activity); id. 12926.1 )
(eliminates single job rule).

Georgia:

GA. CODE ANN. 34-6A-2(3) (2002) (requires a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity and a record of such
impairment, but does not include a regarded as prong).

16-123-02(3) (Michie 2002) (no record of or

Minnesota:

MINN. STAT. ANN. 363.01(13) (West 2002) (a physical, sensory, or
mental impairment which materially limits one or more major life activities).

Virginia:

VA. CODE ANN. 51.5-3 (Michie 2002) (requires a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities or a
record of such impairment. Impairment must also be unrelated to ability to
perform job duties or unrelated to individual s qualifications for employment
or promotion).

States That Define Disability Primarily in Medical Terms
Connecticut:

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 46a-51(15) (West 2002) (any chronic physical
handicap, infirmity or impairment, whether congenital or resulting from
bodily injury, organic processes or changes or from illness, including, but not
limited to, epilepsy, deafness or hearing impairment or reliance on a
wheelchair or other remedial appliance or device); id.
46a-60(1)
(discriminatory practice to discriminate because of a past history of
disability); Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities ex. rel. Tucker v.
General Dynamics Corp., No. 517054, 1991 WL 258041, *6 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Nov. 22, 1991) (reading a regarded as prong into the statute).

Illinois:

775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/103(I) (West 2002) (a determinable
physical or mental characteristic of a person, including, but not limited to, a
determinable physical characteristic which necessitates the person s use of a
guide, hearing or support dog, the history of such characteristic, or the
perception of such characteristic by the person complained against, which
may result from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth or functional
disorder and which characteristic that is unrelated to the person s ability to
perform the duties of a particular job or position).

New Jersey:

N.J. STAT. ANN.
10:5-5(q) (West 2002) (suffering from physical
disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement which is caused by bodily
injury, birth defect or illness including epilepsy, and which shall include, but
not be limited to, any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of physical
coordination, blindness or visual impediment, deafness or hearing
impediment, muteness or speech impediment or physical reliance on a service
or guide dog, wheelchair, or other remedial appliance or device, or from any
mental, psychological or developmental disability resulting from anatomical,
psychological, physiological or neurological conditions which prevents the
normal exercise of any bodily or mental functions or is demonstrable,

medically or psychologically, by accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic
techniques. Handicapped shall also mean suffering from AIDS or HIV
infection.); Rogers v. Campbell Foundry Co., 447 A.2d 589, 591 (N.J. Super.
App. Div. 1982) (reading a regarded as prong into the statute).
States That Employ a Hybrid Model
New York:

N.Y. EXEC. LAW 292(21) (2003) ((a) a physical, mental or medical
impairment resulting from anatomical, physiological, genetic or neurological
conditions which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is
demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic
techniques or (b) a record of such an impairment or ) a condition regarded
by others as such an impairment, provided, however, that in all provision of
this article dealing with employment, the term shall be limited to disabilities
which, upon the provision of reasonable accommodations, do not prevent the
complainant from performing in a reasonable manner the activities involved
in the job or occupation sought or held).

Miscellaneous
Washington:

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
49.60.180 (West 2003) (prohibits
discrimination on the basis of disability but fails to define that term); Pulcino
v. Federal Express Corp., 9 P.3d 787, 794 (Wash. 2000) (holding that a
plaintiff who proceeds on the theory that an employer failed to make
reasonable accommodation must establish (1) he or she has/had a sensory,
mental, or physical abnormality and (2) such abnormality has/had a
substantially limiting effect upon the individual's ability to perform his or her
job).

